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SENATOR MI KE MAN~FIELD

THE COM I NG CRISIS I N GERMANY

ILLNESS OF SECRE'TARY OF STATE
DULLES
Mr. MANSFlELD. Mr. President, be·
tore I proceed to the remarks which I
Intend 1.(1 make on the German Illuallon,
I wish to Bay that I alll deepl.),! dl5tress~
by the ne1ll"S of the lJIness or the Secre·
tary or State.

Th,e duties ot the Secrelary of State
are Just about the most uactlng and
IltrenuoUII in the Government, not excluding the Presidency, The intellectual

demands of the Job are enormous. The
physical demancU are appallln,. For
years, Secretary Dulles has borne up under them without complaint. Hb starn.
Ina Bnd durability hllve been little IIhort
ot Incredible. However,ln the Secrelary,

as In other men, there 18 a physical limit.
Hil total personal dedication to the serv-

Ice ot the Nation haa taken Its toll of

his health. AI one doctor put It, the
Beeretary 1& worn out, It ls a shame,
Mr_ P reSident, that the Nation hu reNo 20&--4

qull"td $0 mIlCh of oue man, And It Is
1 nnt knew Mr Dullrs when he
to the Nation" detriment. moreover, that Itrved. for • -.hon Urne In Ille Umted
he h .. h.d to push hlmKlI beyond the StaLeS senate, But 1 came to know
limit.
him better .. hen J .... rv~ .. Ith h1m tn
We t'n m .trord to !0Ie his ~l'\'lers the Urut.!d NatiON aa a del~ate In 1~50
.t any time We c.n '!)are them leu! and, subsequent t.o Ulat time. for the
.t thl. moment. 6eere"'", Dulle, Is ensuJ.1ljJ 1l months.
needed u never before to eomplel.e the
On Sl'pt.embe:r ., 1950, at .bout 12
vel")' dellc.1.e neeoUaUons on Berlin and o'clock' noon, Pres.ldent Trwnan called
Germany whleh he had Just becun 10 Mr. Dulles 1.0 Ule White HO\L$I'. Mr .
• u~plcloully.
Dulle, .t that time . . . an L1-,l$tant III
Mr_ Dulles has cI!)lOtile IlI&OClate.l In the D<'part.ment of SI.II.e under the Ull'n
the Del)ll.rtment of State, With aU due Sec:re"'l'7 of SLue Acheson. Pruident
respect 1.0 them, however, the Secretary Truman asked l"dr. DuUes on 1.hat day If
will be torely mL&secl In the weeiu .head. he .·ould be "'Ulloa: to L$IIumc the reThe NaUon n~ his areat experience, sponslblllt.y or fonnulaLLna the Japan~
hi. balance, hi, Itrenath, hll ab1Uty 1.0 Peace Treaty. and In .ettlll, the t,,-o
decide.
Itore or more natlon..... hlch ""ould be
I share .·lth the Praldent and the part..ie. to the conference 1.0 aaree to
Nallon the feellna of dlstreu which the 114 al'nenl l.erm.s.
Seeretar,', lIIneu brllli', I know the
If an aMlanml'nt can be lma,lned
Senlte Johu ....·lth me In .... "hln' Mr, which waa more dtmcult .nd more com·
Dulles a full recovery and a prompt re- plex than that of brlngtna toa:elher lOme
turn to his key role In the se.n:h for a 40 natloNi of the world "'hleh ""cre Ircat·
secure peace.
Iy concerned about the terlll.$of the JapaMr. SPARK MAN. Mr. President, "'iU nese l)C'ace treaty, I cannot conce!\'e of It..
the 8elUltor from Montana yield?
But Mr Dulles underl.OOk to do the Job.
Mr. MANSPIELD, I yield.
Mr_ Dulles told me later that PresJdent
Mr. SPARKMAN. I endorse every- Truman a$kl'd him at the time how Ion.
it
.ould takl'_ Mr. Dulle, replied that
thing that hIlS been hid by the d.l.Uln_
aulshe<l Senator from Montana concern- he thoujlht it .-ould take a ynr. Mr.
Ing tlie mneaa of Secretary of Stato Truman thcn .saId, '"I .... 111 alve you one
Dulles and the work which he has b«n year In "hlch to t\nJsh the JOb."
dOing. r have often man'ded, IS I am
At that UrnI'I WIl.s the thalnnan of the
certain m any other persons havc, at his SubcommlUcc on Far En.stf'rI\ Atrllirs of
stamina. 1 t('Call readlna in the preM the conuntUee on Forl'lan Relations. I
recently that durin&" the time Mr. Dulles beeame a mtmber of the committee in
hM been Secretary of State, he haa Jllnuary 19.51. Naturally, I had a. close
tr.\'ele<l more than 500,000 mila, He 1'I'latlonshlp .1th Mr. Dullts In his ...... ork
h AIl m.de many lonr Journey" and often durlna the entire yellr 1951. I 'II'ftlI In
a fte r ha return, perhaPt "'Ithln a day or conrerencc frequently ...... Ith him, because
b'o, he .... ould be 011 on lUIother l()lll: Ulls ,,'U a f'lLr ~tern Question. The
trip.
subcommittee and our ll.5I!istanu mct
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with Mr. Dulles at aU t1J:nes of the day. wlU IJUppOrt Mr. Dullea, and th .." ~
sometimes In the mornln" socneUDlOl at ntiotlattng ability will be felt 10 the conlunch. someUmes In the aftemOODi or ferences, and will cont.1nue to be heJpful
evenlnas. I feel QuiUl certain that dur- even in hLs I.bsenee.
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. Prealdent. will the
ln' the time the treaty '111'' ' belna formulate<!.. the Subeommlttee on Far EMt- Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
em AIr'irs. Mr. DuliN. and his associ Mr. AIKEN. I have been very happJ'
ates had probably 100 dllferent meetlnp.
I bave olLen .aId It was one ot the most to hear the expresalona of ,DD<l 11'111 toremarkable Jobs J ever IJ8.W any man per_ ward Secretary Dulles whlch h ..ve been
form. It WN not clUy to brlna: toaether SpOken today. I wish to Join In them.
I have been a member of the Committhe British. on one hand, and the NIltlonaU.t Chlneu, on the other. It wu tee on Forela:n Relatlona only .. J'eara,
not caa,. to brine: toiether the SOuth.,.... t and have not been IO,CIOllei.J' UIOClated
AAl ... naUolUI and the central European with the work of Mr. Dullea M hal Ule
n ations. But I'radually Mr. Dullea wove Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPIoIlKM AN1,
• plan under which .11 natiolUl ""ere at for Imtance, who hM Just concluded. hLs
leut wlillng to attend. conference.
very nne statement.
The conference '\I,'U held In the San
I think t ew men 10 pUblic life have
Francl300 Opera House. It ended. on liven &0 much. of their time durin, 60
Septembe r 8, 1951. JUlIt before we left many years of their lives to thl:l tormula.t he Opera House. I laid to Mr. Dulles, tlon and administration of tore Ian ~ 
"Thl.l Is the annlveuary of the day YOU ICY a.s has Secretary Dullea. 1 know the
lUldertook to do thls work. At what Nation Is grateful to him for hi' accom t ime of the day did President Truman pllshmen\.S. I k.now oun II .. blpart.l&an
",liIl It to YOU?H Mr. Dullea replied a:ratefulneM. also, lUI the Senator from
th .. t It '11'1.11 at 12 o'clock noon. I looked Alabama ha.s well exprCllCd.
.. t my "'.. tch ...nd, rn .. kll\l ..llowance for
I do not luppose that all ot Mr. Dulles'
the difference In time between Wuhll\l- plans have materialized &II he boped
ton .. Dd C..lIfornla, I II&ld to him. "You they would. But we must recaU that he
llave 8 rnlDUlet to ,p.. re." In other hu been servlnl as Secretary of State
",ordll, the time ]acked 8 mlnutH of and as adviser to t.he secretary of State
beln' 1 year from the ttme Mr. Dulltt dur10i one of t.he BlOllt critical periodt
b ..d undertaken to do the work.
of history, and many of the mOllt dtm·
Followll\l the conference, former Ben. cult prob]etn5 the world hae raced have
at.Gr S mith. of New Jersey; Mr. Dulles, coma betore him for IOlut.lon. We have
acUng for Mr. Truma n and Secretar)' seen t.he lO]utlon of lOO\e ,ltuaUOlll
of State AchetOn; .. nd 1 vblted it. number which were considered vl.rtUa.llJ' uaolu of the Par Eutern countries. We apent ble-for Imunce, the ,Ituatlon 1n
aeveral "'eek. In J .. ~n, wort1n& with TrIeste. I know all of us are happJ' to
the different rrouPi there In arrlvlna: at learn that there are Pl'OQleCtI of pennaundentandlngs, ... best we could. and nent peace and hannonJ' iIi the Island
workln. on the nlher dltDcult problem or cyprus.. where the TUru and &.lIt:!
Involvlnr Natlona.llit China. partlcu. Greeks ha\'e come to an aa:reement.
larly, and the whole China problem. lUI
I believe t.he whole world 0\0'" a con·
well.
Iidcrable debt to Mr. Dulles. I wish. to
It was then that I came to admire Mr. JOin my colleagues In hoplna: that Mr.
Dulles. ll\dmlred his tenacity. his power Dulles will havc a. ,peedy rcoovery, folof Intellect, and hll 6klll In nt\loUating. lowing his trip to !.he hOllPltal, and
One of the great services he hal pe r- I500n will again be back at .... ork. E\'en
formed as SCCreLliry Of State hlUl been though everything may not hne 80ne
In the neld of neloUating between IHr,- as he hope(! It would, yet 1 know of no
tlOIU which hnd difference. and prob. ono who could have achieved a. ]arQ'e r
lems .... hlch wel'e m<»t dltDcult to solve. percent...\~e of succellll than he haa over
I share the feelln"" lI,hlch has bee n these t.roublt.$Ome y1)11.I"3.
expressed by my good frlcnd. tho Senn.
M r. MANSflELD. I t.hank tile senator from MonLRna. as to the need for tor from Vennont.
Mr. Dulles at present to dcal wllh the
Mr. CARLSON. Mr . P re5ldent. will
pa rticula r problem about which the the senator from Montana. yield to me?
senator from MonUlna wlil speak to us
The PRESIDINQ OFFICER.. Does
today. 1 am delllr:hted to know that the senator trom Montana yield to t.he
since Mr. Dulles' physical condition II senator
from Kansas?
luch that his doctou advise his tllklnaMr. MANSFIELD. I yIeld.
leave and enterlN a hospital. ho hlUl
Mr. CARLSON. I appreciate very
acted on that advice. I hope he will
rcmaln away trom his work for IU much much t.he opPOrtunl~y to as.soclate III.Y lSClf
with the remarks of the actina- rna..
time as will be nece."fIlry to result In II.
complete restoration of his health, Jorlty lender IMr. M... NsPluDl. the senwhich 1 am confident wUl take place, ator from Alabama (Mr. SP... RKMAff I. lind
because I know IOmethlnll: ot the phys_ the senator from Vermont IMr. AIKEN),
10 regard to t.he Secretary of State, Mr,
lelll uamlna ot tile man.
I ...·Ish him a speedy recovery and a Dulles.
It seems to me tha t at tl\1s time. ""hlch
rcturn to hl~ ))O;S.iUon u 5e<:retary or
State Just a.s IIOOn 1\.1 he III ablc to do 10. seems to be one or our In'ea.test Inter_
I Iccl certain that his Influence will be naUonai 1'11_. our Nlltlon a.nd the
fclt In the nC1/:otlatlons In the various other nations of t he world can III a.trord
collferences ...'hlch ""Ul be held In the to sJ)9.I'e tlIe lSCrvices of t.his m05t able
future. I knoll' that Ilia &5llstant.l In
the Departmcnt or State ""ho hllYe
Secretary Dulles h as demonstrated not
worked with him tor so lonll: and 10 well only his ability, but, It seem.s to Ine, a
will be able to carry 011. 1 am aure they peculiar temperament fOr work.lna: In

-
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th1s lI.eld. t thlnk he ,e\.S that tempera_
m ent and tl\at bacl::a:round from belna: a
areat Chr13t1a.n ia.J'rnan. H1s loterests
art In people. I beUeve that II what ""e
need. durtna: this period In the world's
hlstoq. I think that one of our prob.
lems at the present time Is to lcarn how
to live with other people. OUr ,enera.
Uon hal not done 60 well; as a matter
of fact, we have foua:ht about three wau
In one ,eneratlon. Somehow, In some
W IL}', our YOUN people, the comlna: reneratton, must learn how to IIve'wlth other
people. When we learn to do that, I btl·
lIeve we shall be able to accomplish
much In brlnllna: about the peace and
the economic conditions that all us of
are praylna and hoplna for .
I w1IIh for the Secretary of State ..
most speedy recovery. We need. him. I
know he will receive the best of care that
doctors and medical 'kill ca.n proVide.
So we look. forward to h1a r eturn to
service.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator from KaIUIII.Mr. Prealdent. I uk unanimous con_
sent to have printed at thLa pOint In the
RICORD, u a part or my rerna.rb. a. ra.dio
COmmenUry by Jack Jurey on February
10, 19S9, the evenlna: of the announcement of the leave ot abIIence lor t.he Seeretary of State.
There belna: no objection, the statement Will ordered to be Printed 1D the
Rl:CORD,1UI follo .... :
'nil. Ia J.cll: JI.I.A1 1I1th the WI'OP eo"'"
mUlt for tonllll.t.
Tha ne_t U1n_ or Secreta.., or Butt
Dullea abould ea.u.e WI .n to join PrftlldeM
EtMntLo.-.... In el<tendlnl ~ W1aJIe- to thla
dedicated otI\claJ who. !!.owen. mUCh One
ma, <II........... th h •• ""Ue'_. 1'1.....o.II:M
.., tlrel_l, on beb .... o. tbe UnIt«! Stat...
We lonl .... !<Mt tnt.cll: ot the to~ mile.
loRed b1 Mr D ... L1 ... In hla peripatetic qutn
tor PUC', or the number ot stopa be h . .
made. Or the number 01 omcl'la to whom ho
h .. t ... ked In vll'tu"'l, all quane" ot the
Ilobe.
But ... <'10 know thl., tha t John Poo~
Dullea Ilnee Ig53 h .. npende<'! hla energies
and ha.llh at • •«kl_ rate. Rt a lime
I1le wMn mc;wt ot .... woula bo realgne<l to
IOttLlnr dO"'" with pipe and .L1ppe..... E>;1'«111111 ,Ince hi, ope,..,tion tor c.ncer. he haa
a l.playll<! In uncommon devotion to dUty.
Thla new. man . ebllLlI ""rUe ... la.l, that
alter hIa nnt·to_laat II1n ...... bout with
dIVtrtlcuLltu •. Mr. Dullea apoloelzed to ..
nO"1 eonle .. nca tor not having aeen repon, .. lOT & period. of leve .... wed,.. S ... cb
'pOl"" ..... not onl, unu .... al In an
a<'lmlnLlltr.tlon wblch IOmetlm ... ue<m to
tIIlfe I 1..;II:Rdall1CRI atUtucte to"",r<t ne .... .
men. but ..... npr_IYe 01 tbe I nn~ It ... "
ot thl' un".uall, Ilfte<l man. In man.,. u·
opec" he Ia a t ... better pubJic servant than
lODle or hi. crltlCa woulel 1I...·e .... belleye.
8peall:lnl ot c.ltIeo, It _rna an appropriate
time to mention that many American.. may
not eomprehena What h .. happened In Ihe
I..t dlOCade to the ollke whlcb Mr. Dulles
holdl.
POt .. ell Onr .. centu,.., and a hAlt. a See·
reta.., ot 8u.u ...... tor \lie molt part a
CabInet al!LcL'" .ub,..,ted on11 to oomparatlnl1 minor It .... na. tOT Ihe reaaon Ihat the
UnlUd 8U.t.. oon.ldered lIMIt (and. w ....
tor tn. _
part) .. remOle laJaD<l In the
.... t ..... 01 tnterno.tLonal troublH- I n the
« (..Ionel periOd ..hen the N ..Uon .... con·
'ron"'", b1 h.... W __ ld "",,Jtle., It ..... orten
the Pre-Ident hI_it wbo bore t.b.e brunt:
Jell'ereon, Madllon, Ll9I.coln. WlLoon. Frink·
lin Rooa/!velt.

0'
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The pOIIt·World Wnr U ,ea .., howe"tr, hue
.een .... evolution fond. elevation of Ihe 6e<:retary ot State', dutlH, to the poInt where
this alnlle man, ",helhe. he be Of(lrle Mu_
,haLL, Dean ""tiMOn, or Dulle., ha. da,.to_
da)' respon,l,bmu. unparaUeled In American
history,
The .tuon, ot course, r. Ihll country', re_
luctant eme'lence ... a m ...., ..e world power,
with ,,11 the trial, and trlbulatLont that .ueh
• IUltUll ImpUe.. ne world IIrUll:lle .·lth
communr.m, conducted. on multldimell_
,Ionllll,,'ell. I. enoulh to .tuln the .trtnlth.
pMlence, .nd reaourc_ or an" man, .nd
certainly one whO. like Secretary DuUet, muat
carry with hIm the burdtII.I or 'dnnc.cl '1'
d the dem.r.ndl ot "n .cU", Chrr.tr.n
Klence.
'e atfI .monl thOll ~.. ho ~lLe ... thlt, on
Ion. l.1r Dullea hat ~en ml_taken W,
• r, tor u.mple. that In lOme t . .pecta
f..,I.cI to demOIl.ltrate the rHlllene,
d th.t new clr<:unuunctl demand.
h thr. crltlei.m doe, not, tor" mo_
eny Ihe Intellectual quaUl'lceUon,
"nsl to hi. leak,
o crlUelu. Of courte, could be
I, hr.tory will tell. But the teet
mur on occulon dOft not dlmlnLlh
I tor the man h\mtelf, onl .. ho
r, heu, load Ind.ftc1.
IUcLam obleu.. the undenl.ble
bl, moment nt tliltory, .·tth the
I on the door ot Welt Berlin,
U" I, Yet, nearl, an India_
to hit countr,.. It would be
rut COnCern mouLd he nnt
Ih Ind nnt be "bL, to tHume
e SUI' Doepanmtnt.
eon'" nd nationll reUON
ho
t SKreta" DuLL"
k
petlUon .nd 'ifiLL be
uldtr the full ... flaM

THE COMINO CRISIS IN OERMANY
Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr.,Presldent. let
m e preface my remarks with this assur~
ance to the Senate: I am not an alarmlst.
I meas~ moet carefully the .. or(\.s I am
about to speak. In that con\oext. I ex;
press to the senate my belief that just
ahead lies the moet critical period ""hlch
the Unlted Slates will have had to faee
since the conflict In Korea.
The crisis. Mr. President. Is comlnl In
Germany, Specitically, It Is COmine In
Berlin. Indeed, It may have already
begun. Por yeau nov.', the ~eds of that
crlsls have lain dormant. in a divided
Germany, They haVe been held In
cheek only by a kind of mutual acqule!~
eense. The Western Powers ha\'e not
wished to disturb the seeming stability In
Germany. Since the Berlin b]oekl'lde.
the Soviet Union has not serlous]y
threaten ed It. A few years a80. uprls~
Ings of Eallt Oermans shook the stability,
but did not break It.
Those who have thou8ht at aU about
the German situation have known for a
long time that the surface calm 1I.. ould
not last. The existence of tv.·o German
authorities In what Is one Germany has
been, from the end of World War II , a
makeshl n arran8ement. The w estern
Powers have recognlzed It, The Soviet
Union ha.s acknowledged It. The Oerman leaders know It.
The key QuellUon has never been, Will
Germany be unined? The qQestlon has
long been, When and how "'Ill Germany
be unltled? Those of us who have urled

nn InltlQtlvc In Amt'rlcan poliCy with re~
SpeCl to Cknnnny have been av.are ot
this distinction, When I addreSM'd my:>elf to thl.~ subjeet In the Senate Ln May
1958, I had the distinction very much In
mind Becau~e I did, I tried to deal In
the s)lt'Clflcs of an American InltJlllu'e,
In su~~estlng. last May, alternatl\·t's to
present polley. my thoUJlht was that
when the Matus QUo lave way, M surely
It must, the chan!!el! ought at \cast to
hold prombe at Il'adlng to the .tr('nlrth~
enlng of freedom In a pt'aceful Oermany.
Mr. CHURCH Mr, Presld('nt .'11\ the
Senator from Montana yield to me?
Mr. MANSPlELD, Mr, Presldtnt. I
am delllhted to yield to my dlstil\i'ubhed
friend from Idaho.
Mr. CHURCH, I w~h to apoloclte
for InterrupUnl SO 5()()n the remarkS
of the senator from Montana, bt'eaule I
believe that the address he Is d~lIverlns
will be a mOlt .llnlncant one, But I
""Ish to ,Iy that, chlraeterlltieally, In
hl$ openlnl remarlU the senator trom
Montana has pierced to the nub ot the
l$$ue. CondlUolll In ~nnany are lolna:
to ehanle Oermany will not lndt'nnltely
rem.ln divided alalnst lIMit, Oermany
",·m not Indennltely eontinue to be larrlltOned by torelln troop~.
It 5eC'ms to me that thOf,(' who 'l'Iy our
forelln polley mu~t be InnC'xible ovtr~
look the tact that oun 1s not a Itatlc
world.
Thert'fore, MT Pres.ldent, I think t.he
Senator from Melnlana rendl'red us a
ICrvlee ",·hen. a yt'IT alo. he emphUlud
the fae\ that conditIOns In Oermany
would be ehan.lll8. and that ""1' mu~t be
prepared to tllce up to those chan.ea It
v.'f! a~ to cope errl'cllvely "!Ih th.m.
F'lexlblllty In our forelln polley Is a
mu~t.
A steel blade bends. Pla Iron
breau.
•
I ""15h to thank the Senator from Mon~
tana for comins fO",'aro at thIS ~1a.1l"t'
In the dl'VeloplnlC Berlm erl.~l. v. Lth a
!I'peech v.hlch • Lll be he]pful In I'h'mg
I'uldllnce to all of us. to the Pre"'dl'nt.
and to the 6l'cretary of Statt', In our
eommoll errort to sol~e that crisiS for
the benC'nt at the free .'or]d
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank my trlt'nd
trom IdahO
Mr. CLARK Mr. PrC";ldent, at thb
POmt will Ule &nator tram Montanll
yield briefly to mt'?
Mr, MANSf'lELD. I am dellll'hted to
yield.
Mr. CLARK. Mr Pr.:w.:ldent, we h .... e
Just'returned to this Chamber from a
most Impre.<,$lve joint $l'SlIlon wlUI the
other body. In connection with the cl'le~
bmtlon of the lM!th annlver&8ry of the
birth at Abraham LinCOln. At the joint
ses.slon, during a brilliant addres., by the
area.t wrlt.er and poet. carl Sandburl', he
had occasion to quot.e a sentence from
Abraham Lincoln, which I believe Is pertinent today In connection with the
IIP]endld addreM which my friend. the
Senator from Montana, Is maklna on the
German que.tlon. LIncoln said:
'I'lle d08m&l or the qUiet po.t\ atfI Inlodequite for the llOnn,. Pl'0H1lt.
I wish to eongl"lltulat.e my fri end, the
Senator from Montana, tor the tine ad dress he I.s making on the German prob~
I,~
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However, I would not be true to myself If I did not /"{"KI~ter a .lIltht dl!W'nt
from solne of the comm"n{4 which ha\'e
been made with respect to the Secretary
of State.
It " unpleMant and unrewardlnl' to
oy unkind thlna. about a man who I.
In phY8Lcal paLn, who has .hown areat
phy",lcal courue, ""ho ls unquesLlon.bly
a patriot. who Is a min of great dedication to the public Interest; but I would
teel untrue to my~('lt It I did not rCj:ISl('r
on the floor of the Senate a dlsunt to
tht' ~tatem('nt that he I. Ind\.\pensable
to the eonduct at our forellm polley In
the Immediate future. I call Ittention
to whit I ha~e laid on other OCCIIIQIU
with rC'!!'peoct to thb matteT .
I hope that these comment.. will b~
teken In good part. and that It will be
wldentood that I mike them only beea~ I ca.nnot remain silent when It
mllht be Indlcaud that I .'11 In accord
"'Ith what has been said.
I think the ~nator for yieldlnl'.
Mr, MANSFIELD. I appreciate "'hat
the dtBt:nlul.hed Senator from Penn.ylvanla has Jtat laid I commend him
tor his honesty and hl.s lntelrlty. Of
couriloe, I TffOlTl1:r.e that It " not a new
\'iewpoint on hll ~rt, but that he has
been eonsi&lcnt In hi. vlev.·, In thls re.peet far some Lime. 1 v.·ould point out,
howe\'er, that the Immediate dallier, as
I 1ft' It. II the Btrlln and the Qt'rman
.Huatl"n, NQ one t.now. more about
thO$C .ltuatlot'll at the present time or
" betlt'r prePirN to Itad the allie, In
mt"l'tml th('m thin Is the 6ecrt'tary
at Statt', On that baals, as v.·e!! u on
other basis. I ",L.!Ih him well. I ""Ish hIm
a ~predy 1't<:0~t'1)'. 1 anucl"all!' Ulll~ In
the not too dLstant future he v.·m «sume
his dullt~, and ""Ill act. not u hl.s ov.n
u·ent. but as the a'{ent of the PresLdent
of the Unltt"d State,. In conductl~ for~
elvn po]lcy,
Mr. CLARK Ob~ioU'ly, I do not .,LVI
to tnRalle In a colloquy of exll'ndtd duration "'Ilh my colieaKue at thll UrnI'.
I should like t.o be rt'COrded as \'l'ry
much hopln.- Ind prayll\Jl: for Mr. Dulles'
Immediate rt'eO\'C'ry: but I cannot a~ree
that th('re arf' not In the State Departm ... nt olht'u u ""ell or better Quahnt"d
than the 5«'retary to carry on the Ger~
man nf' ollatLons. I app«elate that this
Is a IituaLion on v.hlch the diStinf:ulshed
senator from Montana and I dl~.
I shan des1!>t trom turthf'f comment on
thls partLcular phue.
Mr, MAN:'IFlELD. I shall dC'llllt, a1&o.
Mr. Presldcnt. I rept'at. In SUf:IC'slLnll",
]an May, altt'rnnUves to present pOlley,
my thoUjlht v.IlS that whC'n the status
QUO Ra\'e ""ay, as ,urely It must. the
cha\1i:es oUKht at lea.st to hold promiHI
of leadlna: to the Itrengthenlt\i of frroedom In a pen.ct'fu] Germany.
We dLd nC'>thlnll', Mr. Prtsldent. We
took no InIUl'tti\"l'. We "'t'nt on In the
familiar \·lIeUOUSIll'SS. In the famHlllr pnttt'rns of policy pau('rns devised yC'ar.
aRb, In another sC'tUnK. und('r anOlher
administration. We did not face the
fact that thllt policy wa.s Ildequale to
maintain n. ~mblan{'e of stability 1n
OermlUlY only SO lana: as aU dlreeUy conCf'rned ftequll'~ed In the contlnued divl_
.Ion of that nation.
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did not choose to act in a positive Cash.
Ion to change the status quo. Now. the
Russians have chosen to break It. They
have chosen to make the break at Berlin.
They have said, in effect. that, after the
sprit1&' of 1959, the situation wm no
longer be as it has been in that city.
They are qull.(! right, Mr. President.
Things will no longer be the same In Ber-

lin or anywhere In Germany. If there
Is any certainty. It Is that the situation
In Germany at the close of 1959 will be
tar dltlerent from the present situation.
We are approaching the beglnninll' of
the end, the beginning of the end of two

BerHns and of two Germanys.
The question, as I have already obl'icrved, was never. Would Germany be
un.Jtled? It was, When and how would
Germany be unWed? We may now have
begun to comprehend the when; the
actual process of unification Is IIItely to
begin this year. Only one question remains: How Is Gennany to be unified?
Will It be by conflict. by negotiation, or
by ~me mixture of the two? That Is
the question which Is ImpelJlng us and
the rest of the world toward the coming
criSiS In Germany,
CONSTITVTIOI'ML II.UPQNSIIIILlTlU IN THC

The responslbJlJty for establishing
binding foreign policies to deal with the
impending crisis, the coming change in
Germany, rests with the President and
his Secretary of State. Let there be no
doubt on that score. In this bOdy, at home,
In the executive branch. or abroad. It
Is not for the Senate to direct the PreSIdent In this matter. The President wJ!l
have to make his own dee!slons. with
the assistance of the vast resour<:es of
the executive branch. When he speaks
officially on Germany. however. he will
be speaking for aU of us, whether or not
we agree with what he says. There Is
no other way under the constitutional
tiystem of the United States.
To say that Is not to constrain upon
the Senate a silence In these matters.
On the contrary. since we Shall be bound.
since the people of the United States
shali be bound. by what the President
and his Secretary of State do or fail to
do In the eoming crisis. the obligation ot
the senate to debate, to diSCUSS. and to
advise Is real and it is compelling.
The Senate of the 86th Congress was
not constituted so that It might Ignore
pressing domestic Questions. How much
less then. can we remain silent on the
ure-and-death matters ot torelgn polley?
The President and the Secretary ot State
have given no Indleatlon that they would
have this body turn Its back on the crisis
In Germany. On the contrary, I note
that the Secretary ot State has already
sought the counsel of the distlngulshed
ehalrman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations {Mr. Fm.ORIOHTI. I eommend
the Secretary for his Initiative. The
brilliant chairman of the committee has
much to eontrlbute to the e.evelopment
ot POllcy for the situation In Oermany.
It the Senate Is to meet Its responsl_
bllltfes. Mr. President, we must tonn,
through debate and discussion. an under_
standing at the Situation as It Is. and as
It Is evolving In Gennany. We must also

discern clearly the stakes of the people ot
the United States and ot freedom In
that situation. We must advance, finally. Ideas for consideration In formulating the foreign poliCies which are to
safeguard the vital Inkrests of our
people.
These are the thoughts which have Jed
me to these remarks on the coming crisis
In Oermany. I make them In the spirit
of responsible Democratic cooperation
with a Republican administration In a
matter of vlt.al eoncern to all the people
of the United States.
TWO (;"""'A'" AUTlloalTln '''' om: cu...,.",y
Let me begin by exploring the significant realities In Germany, as I see them.
The basic nallty, Mr. PreSident, Is that
there are two political authorities In one
Oennany. 1:hat Is a contradiction
which cannot and wm not stand.. There
Is one Germany. And there are compelling historic and practical reasoM
which require that the unity of that na tion begin to emerge without delay It
there Is to be peace In Europe and In the
world,
I stress the point, Mr. President. that
when we speak of the two Germanlea
we are reRlly speaking not of two nations
but of two political authorities. Each of
these authorities presumes that It Is the
wave of the future In ali Oermany. Each
seeks to draw the whole of the German
people Into Its orbit.
To be sure, there are profound dUTer_
ences between the West Oerman government In Bonn and the East German
Communist re gime In Pankow. The
Bonn f!:overnment Is based upon prin _
ciples and practices of democracy whleh
are eonsonant with those of other western nations and are expressly supported
by the inhabitants of West Germany.
The Pankow regime exists by the methods or authorltarianltm which come from
the East. Its source of authority lies In
the will to power of those who wield the
authority and the acquiescence-how ever 6ullen-of the repressed people ot
East Gennany. Its sunlvai depends. to
a far greater degree than anything we
know In the Western democraeies. on
miUtary and police power-Its own and
the SOviet Unlon·s.
The West German democratic govern_
ment exists. It is there. at Bonn. and
the Communists are not gOing to wish It
al',ay
subvert It away. It Is gOing to
stay as long as the people In that zone
sustain it and as long as the Western
nntions remain eommitted to Its prole(:_
tion against ml\ltary aggression from the
East. We cannot Ignore the fact, however. that the East German regime also
exists. It Is there at Pankow. and German communists run It. even though
Russians may pull the strings tram behind th.e curtain. Unfortunately. I see
no evidence that the Western nations are
going to wish away or subvert away that
East Gennan political authority In the
practicable future.
If neither side ean be ..... I~he<l away, or
6ubverted away, how then Is the division
ot Germany going to be made to disappear? How I~ a unified Gennany.
this essential Oermany, this Inevitable
Germany. going to emerge? There was
a tlmc, perhaps, when It might have been

or

reasonable to hope that the RUSSians and
German Communists would soon find It
too coolly to maintain their control in
ERst Oermany. For years we have
waited for this promised development.
We have waited for the RUSSians and
their campfollowcrs to Cold their tents
and steal away.
What we must ask ourselves now Is
whether there Is any rea'istic basis for
hoping that this development wUJ come
about In the practicaNe future? I regret to say that such pubUc Indications as
there are suggest that the Pankow regime. with Soviet support, Is consolidatIng Its position. that Its authoritarian
hold on East Germany Is. It anything.
more secure today than It wa.s a few
years ago.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a question?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. LAUSCHE. With respect to the
last thought expressed, the Senator from
Montana has stated that the authori_
tarian hold on East Germany Is now
greater than It was before. Will the
Senator deal a little more In-detaU with
that, and state whether the hold Is the
result of the power of the Communists,
or whether It Is the will ot the people that
they be held by the Communlsts?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I should be delighted to try to answer my distinguished
friend from Ohio. I can say, ot course.
without equivocation that the present
GtatU5 Is not the desire or the wUJ of the
people. The souree of my statement Is
the US. News & World Report, the Issue
of February 13. 1959.
I read from page 67. at the bottom:
£ ~st

O erm any', Communist government

h .. J"o< pubUohcd
pinnn~d

oll'lelnl

IIgu.u On

1••

upenCl it urt8 for 1959.

Before I read further I wish to say
thRt aU the Information I have In my
presentation has appeared In the publiC
print. There Is nothing secret or offiCial
about what I am saying. and It simply
represents one Senator·s opinion as to
whnt I think Is the most dimeult and
dangerous question of today.
I continue with the quotation from
the U.S. News & World Report:
We,t Ge,man ftnancl~1 upena. looking
Into the Red.· ftguru. In tbe budget and
out of It. made II. 't.nrUlng dl .eo,·ery.
M!IIlRry .pendlng by tile Ea$~ German
Reds In 1959 Is to be 30 pereent higher than
mlllt.nry '~"dlng plnnned by Wen G e rm~ny.
Yet the Red. roy Ula~ Wc . ~ Germany La
threatening tbe peace or the world.
That Is what I mean when I say that
the Pankow regi me Is more secure. not
In a political sense but in a military
sense. They have been strengthe nin g
themselves on a military and paramilitary basis. Of eourse. the 22 to 28 Soviet
divisions are stili In East Germany.
Mr. LAUSCHE. I agree with the Senator. My IneLination would be to believe that the people ot East Gennany.
lf they had the opportunity, would unshRckle themselves ot the hold which
the Soviet has upon them.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator Is ab_
solutely correct. I have been told that
the figure would run a~ high as 95 to 96
percent or Ule East Germans who, If
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''1ey had the opportunity to vote. would
vote against the present Ulbricht regime.
Mr. LAUSCHE. But the fact Is that
the SOviets and those of East Berlin who
n~ree with the Soviets are applying constantly heavier preSliure In the developml'nt of the mll!tary?
~il.:'
MANSFIELD. The Senator is
Yl.

cc~.

Mr. LAUSCHE. r thank the Senator
very much.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. PreSident. It Is
all very well to hope. as a general principle. for the disappearance of totaUtarlanlsm. We have held t!'lat principle
for decades. but we have also had to
live In a world which has contained since
Its beginning and stll! contains many
totalltarlnn regimes.
No. Mr. PreSident. a valid policy on
Germany. now. must be built on more
than the hope of the eventual disappearance of German total!tarlanlsm. It can
only be bullt on the premise that Oermnny. in one wny or nnother. Is going to
unify and It Is going to begin to unify
soon. Further. it cnn only be bulle on
the permlse that that unity in Germany.
If it Is to come In peace. Is Ukely to fall
short of the ultimate goals set for It by
both the Communist nations and the fr~
natlons--the goal. on the one hand, of a
Communist totalitarian Germany. and
the goal. on tne othcr. of a fully representative democracy In all Germany.
Until a few months ago there might
have been a possibility of evading that
reality for a while longer by assuming
that the status QUO of division In Germnny might gO on Indefinitely. But the
prospect of evasion b now narrowing
rapidly In the wnke of Mr. Khrushchev's
announcement of the coming SOviet
withdrawal from Berlin. The blunt fact
Is thllt soon either negotlaUons leading
to German unlfienUon in peace shall begin In earl'lest or there shall begin in
earnest the use of for<;e to that end.
II!CII1.lN-T ..., CORI 0"'
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This brings me to a se<:ond matter
tI:hlch we must explore. Mr. President. if
we are to see our way clearly In the impending crisis. Thnt is the question o[
Berlin. It Is lit Bcrlln. divided Berlin.
and along the westerli routcs or Recess to
the city. that the first Indlcatlol1li ot the
conflict leading to war or the success
of negotiations leading to stable peace
are likely to appear In the coming
months.
I shall not take the time of the Senate
to review the historic Circumstances surrounding the present dlmcultles of the
western position in BerHn. It Is Simple
enough to find fault with what was done
or not done by political and military
leaders years ago. It Is as easy. £IS it Is
pOmpous. to pass angry judgments on
others. with the prop of hindSight. That
process will serve riO useful purpose in
this situation.
Nor shalll tnke the time of the Senate
to review the legal status of our pOSition
In Berlin. Some may find solace for our
dUllculties in legalism. Even the Russians sought justification for their actions in it. But legalism Is as best a
dubiOUS wsy to deal with an explosive
situation. when there are. liS there £Ire In
this s.ltuatlon. two opposing judgcs, two

opposing judgments. and two opposing
instruments: of mass destruction for
enforcing the judgments.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. Prooldent. wlll
the Senllt.or yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. J yield.
Mr. LAUSCHE. I wish the Senator
from Montana would discuss In R little
greater detail the clement of legalism
being introduced. I hnve my own understanding of It. J think we arc advocating the proposition that there are
certain legal obligations rooted In ngreements which we have made In the PIIst.
and that In making our demnnds we Ins.lst upon adherence to those obligations.
Does the Senator mind discussing th~t
Question?
Mr. MANSf1ELD. The Senator from
Ohio Is correct. Refcrences have been
made to the agreements made at potsdam relative to the occuPlltlon of Derlln.
References have been mnde to tile
agreement entered Into by Gen. Lucius
Clay. at that time commander of OUl"
forces In Oennnny. with the Soviet authorities. by mearus of whiCh we were
guaranteed b~' thc Soviet authorities access by rail. by rondo and by air, from
the western zones in Germany Into the
western soctors of Berlin.
Then. as [ recaU-and T believe the
Senator ""Ill corrobomte me on thJ.s.~ome sort of ngrecment was madc by
Mr. Phillip Jessup and a Russian representatJve whose name [ cannot recall
at the moment. Which aRreement Ma}'or
Willy Brnndt brought to our Mtentlon
at the luncheon held In the Foreign
Relations committee room the other
day. If I remember correctly. he stated
that out of these Jessup-RUSlIll1n consultations • and
agreements.
which
brought an end to the need for the
allied airlift Int.o BcrJln. also came an
B{fI'CCment that we be allowed contlnUed
Rccess. He sugflested that we lOOk Into
the agreement to which he refcrred ns
the agreement of 1949. Unfortunately
I have not had an opportunity to do so
yet.
But there nrc thesc ngreements, or alleged agreements. which give us the
right to gO In and to mnlntaln Recess
between the western zones nnd the west
sector of Berlin.
The Russlnns predicate lhelr claims
on similar agreements. which thcy say
were made at Potsdnm and elsewhere.
Mr. LAUSCHE. It Is the position of
the Senator from Montan.'l., tllen. that
the problem Is more involved and fliT
graver In Its posslblc consequences to
world peace thnn mere adherence to
those agreements would justify. We
must gO beyond that.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator Is
nbsolutely correct. because In my opinIon the pOtentials involved In this situation are terrible llnd tremendous.
Mr. LAUSCHI:':. I thank the $Cnator.
Mr. MANSf1ELD. It does not much
matter now how wc got to Berlin. or
why the RUSSians have no legal right 1.0
ask us to leave. What docs mnUcr. Mr.
President. is why we need to stay In Berlin. lIS stay there -we must. We lice,
bluntly. In a highly difficult and dangerous position In Berlln. Oreat sacrl1lces
may be entnlled In remaining. We had
better understand clearly now tile ~Ig_
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nlficance of maintaining our position
there. We had better understand now
what Is vita! and what Is not vital In that
poSition to the people of the Unlt.l-d
States and to fr~dom.
The administration has responded to
the Rus.lan prOpOSals on Berlln by reIterating a long-stnndlng view of the Nation It has said. as the DemocratJc ad mlnlstrntion before It said. that we will
not be drl\'en from the city. The posi_
tion of this Government. to stand firm In
Berlin. has been endorsed by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. It Is sup_
ported by Democrats and Republicans
alike In the Senate.
It Is a sound position. Only It Is not
enough. It Is not enough to say. Mr.
PreSident. that we £Ire standing fast In
Berlin. That Is a slogan. not a policy.
Nor Is It enough, Mr. President. to stand
fast merely to demonstrate OUI' determination to maintain our legal intel'pretMlon of the situation as against the
Soviet Union's.
Nor Is it enough to say that we !tand
taU In Berlln so that we may continue
to demonstrate In the heart of Communist Germany the matel'ial superiorln' of
f~eedom or tree enterprise ovcr Communist colle<:tJvlsm. To be sure. there Is II
striking contrast between West Berlin
and East Berlin, but I doubt very much
that the people of the United States will
countenance the ~acriftce of a single humnn Ilte for the purposes of propagandistic demonstrations in Berlin. And
before this year Is out many lives may
hnve been spent In BerUn.
No. Mr. PreSident. It Is not for rea.
sons of legalism or propaganda that we
stand fast In Berlin. 'The Western nalions Rre In Berlln because Berlin be_
longs neither to East Germany nOr w ...~t
Germany: It belongs to all the German
people. We are In Berlin be<:ause some
Germans may now look to Bonn and
others to Pankow for leadership. but all
Germans will soon lOOk to BerUn. We
lire In Berlin to see to it that when that
city Is once alrnln the capll.a.1 of all Ger_
mnny. lIS It surely will be. Ole concept
of freedom In peace wll! not be absent
from the scene. If that concept were to
dlsapllear from Berlin. the cltndel of
German natlonal!sm. sooner or IMer It
would disappear from £Ill Oermany.
Then. sooner or Inter. the torch would be
let In Gelmany. whether by Germall
hands or some others. to set Europe and
the world afiame once IIgaln. '1111\t torch
was lit twice In Berlin In the past. and
twice th.e world has paid nn enormous
human price. To see that !t is not lit
again Is In the essential. the vltnl inter_
est of this generation and future generations of the peoplc of the United States.
TIlRt. Mr. President. Is the reason
which beyond all others. justifies the
taking of the great risks which we mal'
soon be called upOn to take at Berlin and
along the westel"ll routes to the city.
We are in Berlin in order to get out. but
to get out Only on condition that the
German politicnl forces which stand for
freedom In peace have a sure footing
and eQunl chance to sun'ive and to grow
01\ their merits In the future capitlll of
nU Germany.
I suppOrt fully the poSitioll of this ad_
ministration on thc ncccsstly of standing
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In Berlin. I question, hov.'ever, the

adequacy with which we have related.
tha~

poslUon to the chanalna situation In

Germany. I question a poUey which
provides that not ollly do we stand fru;t In
BCl'Un, but nlso Implores or demands that
the RmsJans stand fast. Aller years of
try!n;: to get the RUSSians out of the In·
numerable places Into which they
SWRwled after World War II , It Is Indeed
strange to hear that we Dre Insisting that

the Russlnns must not. Indeed. cannot.
lea ve B~rlin, That Is a most peculiar
pos!tlon to u)' the leMt; and the Russians obviously hfIVC no \ntcllUOll of
obliging us by remalnln!:.
It Is clear whal 15 a foot there.

In II

few months hence. the Russians will
leave East Berlln despite our demands or
urgi n gs to the contrary. East Bt'rlin will
then be. once Rgnln. R Oerman cityCommunist, to be sure-but nevertheless
Germnn, By conU'nst, West Berlin wi\!
retain the nll)X!arance it now has, the
appcal"llnCe of a Western enclnve in the
heart of Germnny, for there are thou·
sands of All!ed offiCialS and military personnel In Ule arcn. The contrast will not
be lost on German nntlonallsts In East
or West Germany.
Further, Mr. President, If we are to
hold this encl::we without strugsle, It WIll
be at the su fferance of the Ean German
Communist authorities, H they do not
choose to accommodatc us, then we shall
In all probability ha\·e to fil:'ht our way
through to Berlln. not asalnst RUSSians,
but allalnst Germnn~. Evcn tr this
course does not le:ld to a sreat conftict,
the repercuSSionS In Germany .... m be
profound. Amon": Germans. as flmong
others. blood rna,' pro\'e thicker than
ldeol()fl:les,
As 1 said. there cnn be no Qunrrel with
the need to stand fast In BcrHn. I do
Qucstlon, however, a policy whiCh does
not anticipate the developments 110 hich I
have just outl!ned and faUs to take steps
to m itigate thcm.
I Question, too, n policy which presumes
as our poUcy d()('s thflt the Great Powers
of World War II-the Soviet Union, the
United K ingdom, F'rnnce, and the United
State5--Cnn brim: about German unification. 'TIlerI' may hnve bee n a time when
such a course was I>ossibie. If It ever
e'(lsted, however. It IIoas ycors aso wheo
Germany lay devastnlC'C! and prostrate.
It 11."1\11 years IlSo. III the freshneS!l of the
common ~acriflce~ of WOlid War II nnd In
the meuure o f mutual respeet and toler.
ance II."hlch these ~l\crmces engendered.
Those years are gOne. The time Is nOt
t oday. Today, tllere Is Httle re~peet be·
tween this Nallon and the SovIet UnIon
exeell! the fearful re~peet .... hlch the mil .
Itary polloe r of the one may generate In
the other. Today, Germany Is neither
devastated nor prostrate; It h as become
once aSaln the most d~'lIam!c nallon In
Wes\('rn Europe.
No, Mr Pre~ldent, the eulwhlJe Ames.
the divided Allin of World War 11. are
not In a J)OOltlon lO ordain a unIficatIon
In peace fOl" a revitallled Germany. At
most, they m ay be able to contribute to
thflt unificatIon by rethinking theIr own
security needs In anllclpation of Its Inevitable development. At most. they
may be able to contribute to unification

by exerclsins such Infiuence as they m ay
possess to encourage the Germans them_
6Clves to reach a reasonable procedure
on unifieation alld by sanetlonlng that
p rocedure If It Is sound. It 1.$ the Germans. themselves, however, who 11."111
make the deelsl\·e declslons on unifica_
tion, It they are to be m ade In peace.
noEl!: ALL'''EUUN ELECrIQN'

F urther, Mr. President, I Question, In
present cireum<l:mecs, a poliCy II."hlch
presumes lO lead to the lleaceful unification of Germany solely en the basis of
free. all-German elections. I say now
What 1 said last Mayan this point, only
With more cml.l::lsi~. E,·ents have mo\'ed
a long way since this pollcy was devised
and tile bell no lon:l"cr has a n alto;:clhe r
rccognlzab:c sound when It Is nmg over
and over again In !III' same faslllon. A
G~lman p~lJtienl authol'lty has emerged
In the West. Another polJUcal structure
has appeared In the East whlch 1.$
manned by Germans, even If It 1$ nOt
directed by them. Wh atever we may
think of this structure, there Is no reliable IndlC:ltion that It Is solng to Ita
all'(lY peacefully, of it.s own accord,
There are now military find param!litary German forces In both East and
West Germany. How are these fOlces to
be intesrated In peace? ls thl$ a problem that can be SOh'ed by free, anGerman elcctlons, at least without exten·
slve preparations by lhe G~rmans who
omcer these opposlnS forces?
There are difTering economic and social
structures functioning In Western and
E,'l.l;tern Germany. How arc the$(' structures to be fused In p('ace~ Can they
be hnrmonized by free, an-German electIons, at least voithout cxtel\.';lve preparations by those Gcrmans who operate
them?
I cite these problems as examl)les.
There are no doubt others of a s;mllar
nature
A policy wh:ch advances no
thou!>ht on how they are to be met does
1I0t be{:in to meet the realities of the
German sltu(ltion. If the Ilnlflcation of
G ermany h essential and Inevitab le and
If It is nclther our re5pollSlbll!ty liar In
the interest of this Nation to seck that
unity by force, th.:on I su bm it thnta J>ollcy
which merely clln"s to an unrealizable
s\o{:an or free a ll-Gcnnan elections,
which does not punue German unification by other means, I~ 110 policy at all.
It Is a straitjacket. It Is an excuse for
Immobility. It may well lead down the
bUnd alley of an unnecessary eonf\lc'
or disastrous dIplomatic retreat.
Mr. LAUSCIIE. Mr. P resident, 110\11
the Senator yield?
Mr, !>IAN~FIELD I yield.
Mr. LAUSCHE, I take It, from what
the Senator hflS stated. that the eflorts
lO procure an overall cleetion of citll.ens
of Elst and We.~t Germany have thus
for proved to be futile.
Mr. MANSFIELD, The Senator Is
corte(:t.
Mr. LAUSCHE. TIll' East Cermans
v,·m not con<ent to have an election under which their )X!ople can Ill\·e expres_
sion to the type of govcrnment they
"'."ant, Based upon the fact thnt that
obJecti\·e Is a n unreallzoble objective, an
overall frcc election, the SenMor from
Montana sugcest.s that other means
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should be explored to procure a solution
of the problem, I wish the Senator
",'auld comment on that pOint.
Mr. MANSFII:LD. I believe that the
J)OOltion of the Western Powers on the
Question of all-German elections is one
which stands no possibility In the imme _
diate future, and p~ rhaps In the Indefinite future, of achieving any degree of
success, Therefore we should try to
work out oth~r means.
As I Shall Indicate In the course of
my speeeh. there a re contacts In exist_
ence between the East G erma n Government and the West Germ an Government. These contacts arc made on an
Interzona l baSis, and are tied up with
commcrclal Intercourse and trade commltment.s. I would hope that In considering the Idea of elections, we might
be able to explore, perhaps, Ideas other
!.han all-Germ an elections, even thou gh
they are the most d esi rable, and I should
like to see them come to pass, and we
ml!lht try lO brenk It down-and the
sooner the better-so that the East Germans could expre~s themselves at the
polls, perhaps Just In East Germany.
and deClare to the world where they
want to go, In that way they might set
out from under the yoke the UlbriCht
aovcrnment. whiCh is exercisin g despotic
and complete control over 11 m illion
Germans In East Germany.
Mr, LAUSCliE. The Senator from
Monl.ana elariftCl my m ind on the subJect. In other words. all of us want a
free electJon under IIohlch the people
!.h~m~el\'es would decide the type of gO\· ernment they de<lre lO ha \·e.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Absolutely.
Mr, LAUSCHE. However, e\·ery cr·
fort In that direction has been rebulYed,
and It Is therefore necessary to find other
means of \.r}'inJ! to reach a n agreement.
Mr. MANSF.ELD. T hat Is the idea.
The Senator Is correct. Every elYort to
achieve an all-G erman electlon has
failed because of the Insistent and do::: matie "nyet" nr the S)viet Union.
Mr, SPARKM AN, Mr. President, will
the Senntor yield?
Mr MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. SPAR K MAN, Do I understand
correctly the position of the Senator
from Montana to be that, while lIe ad·
hues to what we have advocated so
long, Ulat Is, free elections for all of
G;,:rmnny, and the Idea of a unified Ger_
mnny, he recognizes the I'ery practlcal
dltlleulty of having that under present
condltfons? Therefore he says that per·
Imps we oUf.ht to make ourselves more
flexible and 5t:!.rt exploring some other
.... ay, and thlt there mll:ht be held a
st'parate election III East G ermany ,d
a st'parate election In West Germ"nr,
and thus perhaps there could be a~rce 
ment u[>on some kind of independent
I:O\·ernment In each of the t ..... o areas.
with the Idea that eventually, as he sa~·s.
because blood Is thicker than water, with
tenmwork lIle two tempora~y Germ anys
wl1\ combine Ihemse!l'es Into or.e Q\·erall
united Cermany some time in the futUre,
even thou Rh we know not how far in
the future.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The purpose of my
speech todny Is to suggest, n'spectfuUy
and construellvely, some pooslble altern -

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

1959

nUve which may be of vnluo to the De _
partment of State, or out of which may
come ideas which would be worthwhile
toward the bringing about of a solution
to this most dlfllcult problem.
Mr. SPARKMAN. I should like to

propound

II.

Question to the Senator from

Montana. He spoke about tlle rigidity
of our posltlon In the past, Undoubtedly
It has been rather rigid. so rigid that
perhaps our country, as well as R great
part of the world, was mthor shocked
recently when Secretary Dulles suggested
there might be more tle:db!Uty thnn we

have given to the Iden. fmd whe!;! he
suggested there might be methods other

than free elections for the solutlon of
the problem. Is It not true. and would
not the Senator agree with me in thl!.
that perhaps we have oversimplified the
matter in assuming that a reuniflcation
could be easily brought about betweeu
the two Germanys?
I may say that about 3 years ago I had
the pleasure of attending an International conference at Ga.nnlsch In Germany. The conference was made up of
people from all the NATO countries, representatives of governments, of'ftcials,
business people, economists, members of
Parliament. and so on, and one of the
German Ministers with whom I had Quite
a long talk made the point to me. the
first time I had ever heard it mentioned,
that reunification Is not a simple mat,..
ter. As has been pointed out by the
Senntor from Montana. It might have
beeu a relatively simple matter several
years ago, right after the war. But
since that time the two Germanles have
grown away from the condition;,; which
the Senator has so well described In his
speech. They have grown away from
some of the Incentives Which might have
pUShed them together.
Furthermore. dilferent enactmcnts
have taken place. FQr Instance. the
Minister ot the Bonn government said
to me, "Thls may sound stronge, comIng from me, but East Germany hM a
social security system which in many
respects Is better than ours:'
Mr. MANSFIELD. It also antedates
our own.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes. Although I
was speaking of the social security of
West Germany, It Is also true that theirs
antedates ours. too.
East Germany has a system which Is
In many respects better than that In
West Germauy. so the ElIl!t Germans
could not be IIl!ked to (lIve UP their SYStem of social security. workmen'S compensation, and land reform.
The &mator from Montana. I believe,
heard me ask the mayor of West Berlin
the other day' that very Q4est!on, and he
heard the mayor's comments. to the crfect that to bring the two Germanlell
together. whenever It may be done, wm
necessitate the resolving of diffcrences
and the makln!> of allowances between
the two govcmments. As I understand,
that is exactly what the Senator'is talkIng about. He Is speaking of the neces&lty on the part of those concerned to
be ready to consider and to negotiate
with reference to all the changCl; which
have taken place th~oughout the years..
Mr. MANSFIELD. T he Senator is cor~
recto

Mr. SPARKMAN. I commend the
Senator from Montana for making this
very able speech and call1ng to our attention a matter which Is not only of tremendous Importance but also ot sreat
timeliness. After all. the ultimatum wtH
expire on May 28, which Is not rar olt.
] t has been suggested since the ultimatum was made that perhaps there will
not be absolute adherence to that exact
date. Nel·enheless. we are approachinK
the day when Ru.s.o;la will leave Bet·lIn.
I think the Senator Is correct In sayinK
that Russia will lea I'e. and that the
United States will be placed In a railler
ridiCUlOUS position If we try to keep Russia there, when. as a matter of fact. we
hal'e been saying to the world for many
years that she should set out of the
different countries whiCh she occupies.
Mr. MANSFIELD. As a matter of
fact. the Soviet Union hall already withdrawn some of I~ troops and a conlllderable number of the dependen~ of those
troops. So It does not appear that RUllsia was fooling· when It delivered I~ ultimatum. I hope that the United States
will do, all I feel certain we arc doing,
everything possible to develop alterna tives and to consider way. and means
to meet the situation. If and when It
arises, when the deadline occurs. 113 the
Senator from Alabama has polntcd out,
on May 27.
Mr. SPARKMAN. I think the Scnator
from Montana Is exactly correct. Certainly we mould be exploring all the
IIlternllth·es. I thlnk the Senator will
agree with me that we ought not simply.
easily, and Quickly reject any proposal
which Is made, but lImt we should be
willing to let the world know that we are
willing to sit dovm and negotiate concerning every proposal which may come
from either side.
Mr. MANSF'lELD. Ye~. I hope both
the Sovlct Union and tile Unltcd Stntes
wl1l get away from the au~omatie re actions of the proposals which one country makes to the other. Usually the
answer Is an au'tomatle ··No." Once In
a while a "maybe" or a "perhaps" and
occaslona~ly a "yes" would be useful.
t
think In that "'(a)' we might begin. at
least on the mllrglnal level. to do away
with some of the dlffercnces. Ir we can
do that. perhaps we can work our way
upward to an eventual solution of the
bigger problems.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will
the SelUltor yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. LAUSCHE. The other day, in thc
talk with t.he mayor ot West Berlin. I
V''1S greatly encouraged by his rcasonallieness in wanting to explore evcry
avenue which might lead us out of dark.ness into the light and to all a.s.sured
peace for those people. May I ask the
senator from Montana If he hill! given
any consideration to the abl1lty of tile
Soviet Union. after It has once with_
drawn Its troops. to jump in again because of Its closeness to this area of
Eas~ Berlin?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I have. Indeed. If
the senator will bear with me. I 511all
discuss that subject brietly when I come
to the ninth point in my recomtllenda~
UO~

Mr. LAUSCHE.
from Montana.
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I thank the Senator

• .,L'TUY W'THOK.WAL IN cnM.NY AI<O
CENTRAL "<iliOn

Mr. MANSFIELD. Finally, Mr. President, I Question a policy which appears
to resard Ill! sacrosanct present mllltnr),
arrangements In Germany and Central
Europe. I can understand. I can accept,
I can support the concept that Western
Germany's ties with Western Europe are
essential to the peace of Eurol)C and they
must not be broken. Within that con ~
cept, however, I callnot comprehend a
view which seems to hold Inflexibly to
the present form and extent of Gennan
rearmament. We have accepted and
even encouraged rises in the German
mllltnry contribution to NATO In certain
circumstances In the past. I do not see
that we Can.lOt accept and encourage
decline" In that contribution in other
Circumstances In the future.
SeCUrity needs are ever-changlnr
needs. Western German reannament is
not an end In ItseU. It Is for the pur~
pose of the defense of Oerman freedom
In common with the dctense of the freedom ot Lhe Western community. It Is
not tor the purpose of keeping rigid the
tables of orSllnlzation and the projections of presumed needs by Lhe mllltnr),
command of NATO. The6e projections.
In any event. hn-ve not been met for
years and the world has not yet come to
an end.
TIle nature and extent of Gennan rearmament and at non-German arma ments on German SOil. in short. Is one
area ot the problem of unification In
which rcasonable proposals for negotiation. wllerever they mny originate.
ought not to be rejected out of hrl'nd.
That Is especially the case If thcse proposals are rclated to the reduction of
ml!ltary power throughout Central
Europe. I know full well that the Russians may havc no Intention of withdrawing from the Eastern European
States in nny circumstances. NC\'crthcless. I can see no reason to make It
easier for them to justify their remain hltj: by a seeminll Intransigence on our
part. 1 cannot sce that the road to the
eventual frcedom of states like Poland
nnd Creehoslovakla Is madc casler b)'
such a process.
II.1JSIIU,," .ou 1>/ THE CO"",,",; CI\,SI!l
Mr. PresJdent. let me turn now to thc
qucstion of RUSSian Intentions In the
coming crisis In Gcrmany. In this mat~
ter tllere Is only one certain course.
Whatever they may do. we must assume
that the Russians are actins 10 cnhance
the position or the Soviet Union ancl that
of totaUtnl"lan communism throughout
Gcrmany and Europe. We must tliso nssume that they will use whatever meth_
ods they bellevc \\\11 lead to these ends.
not excluding aggressive war. The Russians may blow hot or they mny blow
colct. Thcy may clown a plane on thcir
border onc clay. They may release a.
blocked convoy thc next. We cannot
know with certainty why the)" act as they
act a,I. any {liven momcnt.
We cannot know with certainty the
purport of Mr. Mlkoyan's recent viSit t o
the United States. we cannot know with
ccrtalnt,y the meanlns of Mr. Khru-
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shchcv's comments on a thaw In thc cold
waf. They may be meant to provide a
~eUing for sucecssful negotlatlons. They

may be meant simply to confuse or beguile.
If they do confuse, If they do beguile,

however. we shall have no one to blame
but ourselves. We ought to be able by
this Ume. years after the Ill-fated Gene_
va Conference of 1955, to distinguish

between the conc!l!atory gesture and the
act of conciliation.

Those of us who

come from the cold country have learned

through bitter experience that winter

thaws can be followed by summer frosts.

The promise of spring in February Is not
the same as the coming of spring In May.
There Is, as 1 say. no way of knowing

v.. lth certainty what some particular Soviet gesture or other slgnitles. What we
can know, Mr. President, Is that they are
all, gOO<1 or bad, peripheral to the cri~i~
which l~ coming in Germany, ML', Mi koyan's visit is not going to free us from
that criSis, Mr, Khrushchev'S thaws w!ll
not do it, Increased Soviet-American
trade has little relation to It,
l! we are to be prepared to face this
crisis in Germany it will be best not to
become distracted or obsessed by the
twists and turns of Soviet behavior, It
'\I.'HI be best to keep our eyes on Germany,
The fundamental question of policy for
WI Is not so much what the Rus.slans are
looking for In Germany, We know what
they are looking for; and they may very
well seize It while we amuse or faselnate
ourselves by trying to interpret the
charades of Rus.slan behavior,
No, Mr, President; more important, far
more Important, to us Is to know what
we ourselves are seeking in Germany,
We must bring to thll'; eril';is not only
courage, but also conViction. We must
bring to It a positive and understandable
policy which meets our es.senUal national
needs and the es.senUal n(!(!ds of freedom,
TIn::

~NT1AI.S

01' A WESTnN PQl.ICT IN TilE
COMINC C1I151$

As I noted earllel' In my remarks, Jt
Is not for the Senate to direct the President and the Secretary of State In the
conduct of the foreign relations of the
United States. Dut it is a responsibility
of Senators to try to contribute constructively-and I wish to repeat the
word "constructively"-to the policies
which govern those relations. lL is In
that sense, Mr. President, that I seek, In
these final comments, to express the
thoughts which this exploration suggest.s--thoushts on the essentials of a
sound Western policy for the coming
crisis In Germany. I have no cryStal
ball, I have 110 secret information. I
have not been coached by anyone, nor
have I been a~ked by anyone to dell vcr
this speech. What I suggest may not be
valid In thc light of the creatcr understanding of others. It is one Senator'S
views, based UllOn what he has read,
what he has heard, what he has tried to
reason. It is, In short, the course which
suggests itself to me 011 the ba~ls of the
understanding which I have been able to
draw out of the confUSion and complexIty of the German situation. I can be-and may well be-wrong: and I stand
ready to aeeept a better llluminaUon of
the problcm through discussion and de.

bate in the Senate. For whatever they
may be worth. howcver,l outUne the following points as essentials of a sound
Western policy on Germany.
First. It Is essential, Mr. President,
that forces representing the concept of
freedom In peace not be driven out of
Berlin. They need, at the least, to re main on a basis of equality with the
forces of totalitarian communism In the
future capital ot Germany. If those
forces are to have a chanee to remain In
peace, a Western Initiative for peace Is
essential.
Second. It Is time to call upon Gennan
leaders of the two BerUn communities-East and West-to begin serious el'l'orts to
unify the municipal government and
public services of that city.
Third. To that end. Mr. President, It
would be helpful to enlist the conciliatory services of the Secretary General
of the UnIted Nations. J! agreement
can be reached by East Germany and
West Germany to establish an all-Berlin
government, then It will be desirable to
replace both Soviet and Allied forces
with a United Nations interim pollce
force composed of contingents from na_
tions not directly Involved. That force
might 5upervi~e the agreement, and
might sec to It that all the routes of
access to the city remain open until Bel'Un once again becomes the capital of a
peaceful, unlfted Germany. It may be
that In the B~rlin micrOCOSm there may
evolve paUerns of unification which will
be applicable to the larger problem of
all-German unification.
Fourth, If this approach or some such
approach to a unified, neutrallzed Berlin
falls, Mr. President. then It Is essential
that the forces representing the concept
01 IreeClom In peace III Herhn rem::l.ln III
Berlin, regarClless of whether the Russians leave. Let them go, if they will. I
would not wiSh to see this country a party
to any Insistence that they stay.
Fifth. At the same time. howevcr. the
forces rcpresenting free<iom In Berlin
must be Gennanized as rapidly as pas.
sible. It is time to think seriously of
replae!ng the thousands of alUed mili·
tary personnel In Berlin with German
ml1!tla, fully supported by NATO guarantees.
Sixth. Some may regard dlseUs.~lons
betw(!(!n Germans of the West and Gcrmans of the East as tantamount to recog·
nltion of the East German Communist
regime. Some who regard as appease ment not only talk. but even thought,
which apparently is allen to them. on the
serious problems of the Nation, may even
go so far as to label wIth this stamp of
pol!Ucai chicanery any llropos,,'lls of
mcetlnss between East and West Germans. Let them do it, Mr. President; it
15 their prlv!Jcge.
But let me say thls:1f talk constitutes
recognition or appeasement, then we
have appeased and reco;nized Communist China. because a representative of
this Government has becn talking on Its
behalf, on and Olf, for years, with a Chi.
nese Communist representative In Gen.
eva and Warsaw, Il talk constitutes
reeognltlon or appeasement, then the
Wcst Germans have recognized and appeased Pankow for yenrs. The fact is
that East Germans and West Germans
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have worked out practlcal agreements of
various kinds between the two zones of
Germany. Ai; early as 1951, West Germany's exports to E:lst Germany tot the
year totaled $201 million. During the
first half of IS58, $125 million in trade
moved In each direction. That kind of
trade, Mr. President, does not take place
without talk.
I do not know what the theory of
International law may be. I do not
know \\'hether talk is tantamount to rec·
ognltlon. I do know that, as a practical
matter, we have talked with, but have
not recognized, Ccmmunlst China. West
Germans have talked with and traded
with, but have not recognized, Pankow.
What Is Involved In the coming erlsls In
Germany Is not a clas.sroom problem on
the theory of international Jaw. It Is
the life or death problem or peace or
war. The stake Is the lives of tens of
mHllons Of human beings, Americans
Included.
I cannot see that there Is going to be
any peaceful solution of this problem
without a great deal of talk-between
Gennans who are In authority In the
Federal Republic and Germans who purport to be In authority In the Eastern
zone. It seems to me essential, moreover, that this talk cover the whole range
of problems of unification of the two
zones, the whole range of problems Involving the ll!lrmonizlng of the political,
economic, and military systems of the
two zones.
Seventh. There 15 a point beyond
which the SeRl'Ch for peace can lead to
the jeopardizing of freedom. Regard·
less of whatever agreements emerge, it
seems to me essential that the people of
East Gennany have wme genuine choice
In the 101m Of ContrOl which Is exerclsecl
over them. There mUSt be provision tor
the protection of the rights of all peaceful political forces in all Gennany. AllGerman elections may not be essential_
although I think them highly deSirablebut at least there must be a chance for
men and women of Eastern Germany, as
lII'ell as those of Western Germany, to express themselves and their polltlcal preferences and to partiCipate In political
atTairs without the threat of terror.
WhMever may be the details of the
fUSion of the two zones, they are best
left to the Germans of the two zones.
The Gcrmans are likely to know better
than anyone else what will suit them and
what Is possible among them, Furthermore. It Is Inconceivable that at this late
date the erstwhlle allies or World War II
can work out these details on their
behalf.
Eighth. The eontrlbutlon which the
Western allies, as well as the SOviet
Union, need to makc, If there is to be
pence, Is to guarantee, tor a period or
tune, the kind at unified Germany which
ma.y cmerge from disclltslons among the
Ocrmans. What the former allies need
to do Is to see to it that a unified Germany neithcr Is subjected to military
pressures from Its neighoors, nor becomes a source of military prcS!!\lre to
its neighbors.
Ninth. To that end, Mr. President, It
Is essential to include within the scope
or our policy the search for agrecment.s.
Which, while Ihey do not compel a sever-
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nnce of West Germnny's numerous ties
with western Europe, may lead to IIml.
tatlons of armaments throughout Ger.
many and central Europe. Also needed
are agreements which wUl pull back the
so-called ultimate weapons and thc
armed forces of both Eru;t and Wcst
from the points of Imminent contact In
Germany and in central Europe. In
short, Mr. President., It seems to me
essential that our !>{lllcy, NATO's policies. do not exclude n careful consideration of the Rapackl Plan. the Eden Plan
for a demilitarized zone in middle
Europe. or similar proposals In connection with the unincatlon of Germany.
Perhaps the best way to consider tl)ese
matters would be to predicate them'on
reasonable agreements which may
eme~e from the Geneva Conferences on
Surprise Attacks and the Suspension of
Nuclear Tests.
N~w getting back to what th~ distinguished senior Senator from Ohio (Mr.
UUSCUE] mentioned II. while ago, he
ru;ked, I believe. If I rcc:lgnlzed the significance of a pullback and how It would
benefit the Soviet Union. I do recognize
that In some kindS of pul\back the West·
em Powers would receive \he worst of
It. but I think we ought to recognize
also that If there Is to be any poSSlb!llty
of peace. we Shall have to make some
conccs.slons; this might be one of them.
We need to reeogn.lze that In so doing. if
a withdrawal. based on a reasonable
6OIuUon were brought about, w'C would
be the ones who would take a loss In
position, since the Soviet divisions. In gOIng back to the heartland. would be in
striking distance and would be better
prepared than we would be to carryon
an), rnllltary activity In that area. Dut
we have to develop give and take,l. by
starting from the noU.om and worJ<lng
upward. If we do not get out of the
position of rigidity. I blJleve the situation In Berlin and In Germany will become worse, and the bases on which
there , GP:n be peace will bec.ome fewer
and tllwer:
MI, LA,SCIm: Mr. President. will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. 1 yield to the Senator tram Ohio.
I
MI. LAUSCHE. I agree with the
statement 01 the. Senator. In my opinion. there Is a condition existing in
which. If the Soviet Government" continues to dictate to the government of
East Berlin. It will be Impossible to bring
about a reconcillation of East and west
Berlin. SOviet Russia will not tolerate
it. Bru;ed upon the adamant position
01 SOviet Russia. and based upon the
rigidity of the situation as described by
the Senator Irom Montana. while the
matters about which I have spoken are
hlghl)' desirable, I ag:ree we should look
for other avenues to escape the great
holocaust which seems to be threatenIng us In the futUre. I, for one-and I
believe confirmation has been given to
this view by the mayor of West Berlinwould want every avenue explored. talks
had, continued talks, In the hope that
60rne solution may be found.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is
correct.
No.24-S

Mr. President. I have taken a /!Teat
deal of the Senate's time today. I have
tried not to take It lightly. I have done
so be<:ause It Is clear·that this administration, following the example of Its predecessor. has committed the Nation. to
stand fast Ilt Berlin.
It Is a resolve well taken. Since we
cannot yet perceive to what extremity
of sacrifice It may lead in the months
ahead. I have felt It essential to try
to set forth for the consideration of the
Senate my understanding of what is In_
volved In the coming crisis In Germany.
I am grateful that In this crucial lime
the Senate's prlclpal member In these
matters. the outstanding Senator from
Arkansas (Mr. FuLBRICtn') is a man with
such a deep understanding lind Intelligent grasp of the Intel'llatlonal forces
that play on the Nation. 1 hope that he
will make his voice heard: I am sure
that the President and tile Secretary of
State will listen mQl;t carcfully.
I
would hope. further. that bet ....·een them
will evolve a pellcy that ail of us. as
Americans. will be glad to support.
MQI;t Important. Mr. President. I hope
that the President of the United States.
his Secretary of State. and the CongreM
will fortify the resolve t.o stand fast In
Berlin with the conviction .... hlch only
a positive policy for peace can give It.
The Secretary of StlLte has spoken of
mutual conceSlSions. Those are calm and
wise words for this moment In time. with
the clOUdS of radioactive death wa.ltlng
to envelopc the earth. I hope. deeply.
that they will lead to a poSitive pollcy
for peace. It is tIl::t kind of a policy
for which rational men everywhere are
waiting. It is tha.t kind of a policy
whkh tht'y will be nble to c.omprf'hl'nd
and to which. if need be. the)' wlil be
able willingly to consecrate their livt's.
The policy ha.s yet to be formed. It
needs to- be formed soon.
If It Is
formed, the concept of freedom In peace
wlil not perish in Berlin. in Ocrmllny,
or in the wocld.
Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President. will the Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. 1 yield.
Mr. JOHNSON of Tcxas. 1t has Dcen
a treat to be privileged to hear an exccllent speech. such as a thc one which
hns just been concluded by a great mnn.
The distinguished Senator from Montana has made many contributions to
the cause of peace In the world. but
none more Important than his forceful
statement today. Alwa)'s responsible.
always constructive. wc his colieagues In
the Senate tal(e great. pride in serving
with him.
On behalf of the Stale which I represent. I wish to Say t.o the State from
which he comes that the world Is a better world because of Muh; MANsrIELo.
and that the suggestions he has made
today. predicated upon the /!Teat philosophy of Isalah's advice. "Come now.
let us reason toge\.her:' should be heard
around the world.
I thank the Senator for his constructlve contribution. I feel very humble
to be able to sit in his presence.
Mr. MANSFlELD, I tha.nk the distinguished Senator from Texas.
Mr. President. I yield the noor.
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Mr. WlLEY. Mr. President, 1 was
given a copy of the ftne address which
the distinguished Senat.or from Montana delivered today. I read It. and I
have heard part of the address today.
I all:ree very much with the very nne
encomium paid by the distinguished maJorlt)· leader to the S:mat.or from Montana. As many folks have said. "MIKE
MA);SnnD is a real guy." I agree ",Ith
that statement.
J can agree with much the Senator
from Montana has stated. I particularly agree Dbout the need for us In this
Chamber to discuss responsibly and constructively not only foreign poliCies but
also aU measures in that manner. Pull
and free debate was and is an essential
element. of a bipartisan approach.
I wish to say to the very able Senat.or,
there Is no need for the Senat.or to reassure the Senate regarding his serious
purpoae and his careful Choice of words.
I and my colleagues on this side of the
aisle always are confident the Senator
wlll give 6Ober.intelligent and construc.
tlve addresses on any subject. foreign
policy or anything else. He Is "that 60rt
of gUY:' as someone has said. The Senator has set high standards for himself,
and I congratulate him.
I should Ilke to record my agreement
with the Senator concerning the seriousness of the Berlin situation and the need
for al1 of us to maintain open minds nnd
the utm06t of flexlbll!t)', in conslderir.g
possible avenues for a possible resolution
of Lhe problem. !n accord with the free
..... orld Interest. Indeed. I think we have
ben given a sound IIccount of the background of the situation in Germany. liS
well n$ a number of ciues-I hesitate to
caU them oil essenlials-t.o~';ard flmllng
the peaceful solutlon ..... e seek.
However. I should also like testate my
belief that at }east Lwo main elemenl..s
!n the current O~rman scene have been
bal'ely mentioned In my colleague's not.
Ilblespeech.
The first missing ingredient concerns
the past and continuing requirement
that the United S"tates consult with and
move in concert with its allies. e~peclally
F'rnnce. Great Britain. and West Germony. There is no question that I.he
Sovlct Union. acting only in Its own Intefestll. In the very nature of things has
been able to represent itllelf as ostensibly
more fleXible thlln the West In propnganda Rnd dlplomntlc approaches to
central European problems.
We must remember that the west
German Government itself hilS been n
foremost exponent of firmness In dealln",
with the U.S.S.R. This point golns In
importance ""hen \\'e recall the remarks
made by the Senator about the unlfl.cation Question being one for Rction by the
Dermans themselves.
We kno\\' who holds the strings in Ea~t
Germany. We know who controls E~.~t
Germany. We might as well look that
Inct In the face. They not only control
East Germany. but they also conlrol
CZeChOllloVRkia. Bulgaria. Romania. and
1111 the Baltic States. It is not a Ques·
lion of the East Germans and the West
Germllns getting together.
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We were told the other day by WUly
Brandt, Ii. statesman. which wu confirmed to me pe~lly by Mr. Ade-

leo.dershlp ....111 be the beet r uare.ntee tbU
flUlblUty II not flabhlnteS IUId that •• tron,
and touKh h .. nd lIln chlU"l" The RUMI .. n.
will malr.. no dlUlleroua. rnlltU:ea whll. h. II
there ..... d our alll" wU1 be mUCb Ieee .ppr._
belUlve.
There I. one queotlOn .... hlch. It ..e kne ..
the a.n.awtr to It. WOUld 1I,ht up the .. hoi.
.Ituatlon. Why I. It th.t Mo.eo.. haa opened
up Be.lln .nd til.. GermlUl qUMUon no..
rather thlUl. let u. My. 2 yeu. hence? Th.
Ru ..l.. n. kno .. qUlttl well th .. t Oerm .. n opinIon II evolvln" .nd that D•. Aden .. ue.·, .,.
fu ..1 to n"KOtlat. on. reall.tlc baall .... m not
be held to by hi, IUCceUO ... In 2 yea ... Mr.
Dullel will be out ot oI!lc., IUId unlU ,·try
recently the....aa no difference between hi.
poIltlon .nd Dr. Ad.nauer·,. In 2 yM ....
morean., the....1lI h+-If til., Ru ..l.n. bI_
U......11.'1 &'nltol' 8""'11<01'0>< IUId Ollllr,
..y_ mu1r.ed eblfl In the ballUlC. of »OWU.
Why. then, ... th., In IUCh • hurry DOwt
Ny own lun,... hlCh retttl only On hlnle and
Inler,Ii"... II that Ih.y ..,ltd til.. pa.ltlon
In Eaatern Otrmany, and perhapt alK> In
EMtern Europe, at prec.rlOUl .nd pol'lMI.Uy
npIOll... Thty .rt deeply concerned, I I
,v"yone 1r.no..l. about wut Oerm .. n rev ... a.ment ..... hlch ..III h ••• been ac:hl ...1d In
.bOUt 2 reus. Why
th.y K> concerned
.bout It .. hen th'y tbemt.hu h ........y
mUCh bl'IU ......" .nd . . . .tao thelnNl...
• Ilnt-cl... nuel .... po .... t When I aalr..td
10m. of the PIOpl, I .... In Voaco....hy th'7
.... o.. led K> much .bout Wpt Oerm.n ....ma_
men! .... hen they cOUld .nnlhllale Welt O1!rmany wIth their Int •• medlate_nz'K' mllell"
the Itock .nl.." waa that they rearld .n
armed Oermany blc1r.ed b1 til.. United 8tat...
But J dO not thInk that thl.l Ia the 9111.011
nplan ..aon 01 th'lf I ..r, or, rath.r, J dO
not think thlt It ,pellt out til.. n.tlU. of
thel. Itill. My PeN I. UIt.! they h .... no
1l\\alonl .bout the dlaCOntent of the Eaa!
Oerm.na, .nd that .... hat they fe .. II that
the Za.ot Oerm.", ...hen they He • nO'onl
WMt Oerm.n army 1_ th .. n 2 hOur, ..... y.
m.y be IOrely tl!IJIPled to .tart lUI uprlalnl
In Clhoota ..Itll oftlce.. ot tile WMt Oermln
•• my. It that hlppene<l, the rat would b.
In the n.e Ind both the United 8ltteo Ind
~h. U.S.S.R- .... ould be Involved.
8om,,"ln, or thla K>rt lI, I feel aure. the
CN~ or lh. Oerman problem tad.y. There
" .... enr_pr_nt .nd g:ro.... ln' d.n~~ of
,uolt In EalItarn Europe .... blch would ,ntall
8o"rlet Ulurventlon In the Huol.rlan mln_
ner IUId "'ould unuold.bly brlnl .bout •
,ren .... r, The RUNI.n...re undOUbtedly
.... orrled lbOut thl •• and trUly reaponalb1l
men In .. ll the Welte.n caplt..11 .'e equ .. lly
..orrled about II. Only tha.e .... ho hllV, more
emoUon lhan they have lmasln .. t.lon and
fo.eol8ht take the .Ie .. that lUI Eaat Europe"" uprlllo, would be. .... onderful .nd IUlt
.... hat the Iree world ..anti.
It 1.1 the Impendln, d"n,er In Eutern
lturope Which mue. It Imper .. tiv. to mov.
1oO-..cI Ge .....n ntiotlUlotl.l, For the "beoIt,
.. nd perh ..PI til.. only..... y to • .,ert the d.n_
Ktt 1.1 to mo•• to .... rd Ihe beKlnnlngB of the
reunlftC"ation 01 the two GermlUl,.. We
Ihould make the Kremlin underst.nd Ihlt
..... epproMh til.. OOmlrlg necoUatlon •. not
... Ith Intl!M to provoke In uprl.llng In Eaatttn
Europe, but In ordtr to nnd .. n .. Itern .. tive to It.
The R.... I.n problem In Germ.ny .nd Eu _
rope 1.1 nOt hOw to oonquer .. nd .. b5Olb w.t_
ern EUrop". Thl. Ia ...... y beyond .... ytllln,
that 1.1 within their re.ch. The Ruttl.n
problem I, ho .. they elUl dlaenrase them_
..,lve. In Eaatern EUrope ..Ithout leopllldlz_
Inl their Own .aeutlty. HOW can Ihe 8lItI!l_
lite. becom •. not their viOlent eneml". but
neutrBI$1 At bottom the problem 10 how to
let 10 ..lthout t.U\nil oil' .nd bellli ruu over.
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made. The Senator places Kreat em.
phasls on the fac~ that ultimate unlftca_
tlon of Gennany \.s Inevitable. and that
naUf, that If the East Germans had their
we Mould have recognized It and should
own way 9.5 percent of them WQuid Join
have done more about It,
with the West.
Exactly v,'hat ahould we have done?
In fact, I could not help feelinr that
When we are faced. l\.IallUlt the Kremthe address of my dlsUl\j'Ulshed collea,ue
Jln, which has taken 000 million human
had a slight tone In It which was hard
beinlll Into It.s orbit, and when the
to undel'fiUnd. The Senator seemed to
UnIted. States has-placed. as It were, 11.11
alternate back and forth between ,\vlnl'
Iron eurtain aKainst the approach onto
us and the Oermans primary responsiWest Germany and onto France and the
bility for taklnr the Initiative. I do not
Lowland$-what e.hould we have done?
complain. fOf this Is a natural conseLet us eOlUllder. The fact is that the
Quence of the Ireat complexity ot the
Inevitablllty of the ultimate reunitlea luues at ,take. More Important. I do
tlon of Germany has been reeogruzed by
not complain of any sacrtt:ce of ftexlthe Western countries alnce the end of
bllle), which may be Inherent In our need
World War U. That has been common
to act in .,recment with our amea, for
talk Germany hu to be brought to I am certain th.t we can all .rree the
,ether. UnlfteaUon has to come.
Western al\lance Is the cornentone or
We have not only recognized that fact.
the tree world .ecuflty,
but ,,'e have allO recOlnl%ed that a d iThe seco nd mininl iniNdlen!. In my
vided Oennany cOMtitUtes a serioUl
view, is the Ja ck of recorn1tlon accorded
th rut to the peace. W illy Bre.ndt was
to the efl'ortA of our Government and to
quoted by the newlpapef3 }'ester c1ay.
the etrortA of our aUiell over the yeau,
after he had had a talk with the ~ 
to $BY nothln, of the recent concentrsted
dent. as saying that c1eftnltely the Preswork over the pa.t weeks and months,
Ident said ",'e are not Eo!ng out of Berto""aro ftndln, wa,.. to nelOUattl thl.
lin, We are lUCking. W e are there
e)l[ tremely serious problem. In fact, the
with the purposes we have always hA4,
headlines this morn1n1 contain new. of
That. in substance, was the remark.
W estern w!lUnl ne" to widen the 1C0pe
We have not only recogruzed thl4 faet,
of en vls a led neloUation s, which conbut we have re¢olnll'.ed. that a dlvlded
ftrrm the activities of M r. Dulles and his
Germany consUtutes a threat to tho
European counterparts. Clearly, our
peace. Both the Republican and DEmo·
poUCY hu not put us In a etraltJacket.
eraUc admlnlstratiolUl alnee 19~5 and
I think It Is also clear that my col1948 have made unrelentlna: etrorts to
lea~e hU,1n the fUhlDn of Don Qubote,
brl~ the four ton~ tQff;ether.
I rebun dolna: a little tntlnl at a stone well,
member the etroN whleh have been
and that stone "aU is tbe Kremlin, not
made time after time.
the Eut O ennan,.
We actually 1I"0t an agreement at the
Oeneva Conference In 1955 tor a reDespite these few dlmcultles I have
unlftcatlon of Oennany and for free
encountered .50 far, I thank the dlsUnKulshed Senator from M ontana. In a ll
eleetlons. What happened? Of course,
urlousness. for a hllbly lIlumlnaUn,
the RusslalUl broke the aKreement wIde
open. The Russlall3 reneKed on the
presentaUon of the crux o f the Berlin
problem. lam not prepared to comment
aareement. All of the lubsequent erin depth on hIs usefUl address. because
tortA to achieve reunlfteation. including
I ha\'e not had time tor that. However,
the notes we sent last fall, have tailed.
as frequently happena. M r. Walter UppWe hM'e been working at this a long
mann', column of t<lis 1l10rninK contallUl
time.
.5Ome thoughts which I COlUlJder exI desire to give credit where credit Is
tremely pertinent to this subject. .50 I
due. I do not care to say simply that
ask unanimous con¥flt that there may
we are at fault If we cannot get a govbe printed at thIs point In my dIscussIon
ernment to reMOn with 1.18 and to work
the comment.s of Wall.el" LJppmann in his
wIth us. That Is what has happened . .50
article of this momlna:.
f ar as the Kremlin 14 concerned. but we
have been on the job.
There beIng no obJection. the article
As I have said, In Oeneva we obtained
was oroered to be print.ed In the RUOIID,
an aKreement for tree elections. \'Iho
",follows:
pushed
that aireement? We did. AfterMa. Dvu._ 111 N - . .
ward It went out the window. The rea·
The re II no re"-'On 1.0 doubt. thU .John
SOli the West Oermans have been re ~let" Dull". .. Ill 011<:<1 'K.ln come out on
butred Is that the Sovlcts have been untop. C&l"Tled throulh hla O<1Ieal not only by
hi. It.am.ln'. whiCh II t.buioul. but .IK> hy
willing th Alree to any plan of reunl!"lea·
th~ knowledge th.t he I,.t lh.ll moment tho
tLon which would not Kuarantee the
Indll:p"n..ble mlUl. Ttlece hue been limn
bolshevism ot Westcrn Oermnny and Its
In the paat when ttungB ...... e .. t the end ot
annexation to Eastern Oermany .
• ch"pter ... nd he could ..Uh graee IUId dl,This Is not the ftrst Ume In world t,; nlty have mad....y for' younKer ""... But
tOry that .... e hnve been unable to obtain
not lun n...... Thll lI. periOd .. hen thin,.
a.ueements that were valid. and that
.. re movll'l towlU"d • dhn"" .•Iter whiCh tht
world ""'y be vtr,. dllf..-eo>t. IUId he. hhnMlf,
would be kept by the other party. Out of
u at thecllmu 01 hi. care«.
52 aKreements we made with the K rem·
There 1.1 no one tiM In the We-tern World
lin. the Kremlin broke 50 of them. That
W"O h ..... uthorUy. eomparable with hll. to
Is the situation we are meetlnK. We must
leo.d t b. enonnoully comple:t negotilltlOnl
recognize thellmple fact that the SovIets
.. bout Ge. "",ny IUId .bout Europ" whiCh In.
have a clutch h old on Easte rn Germa n y.
on. way or lUIother Me no .. unavOld"bl...nd
The
OermalUl are not free. They are
Mr.
WILEY.
Mr.
P
resIdent.
I
have
Imp" ... Uve. 11 the Weat mov.,.. aa I~ mu.t.
from • pol icy of l\.andlnl pat. to One 01 gone over theoe ~ n ts ... hleh the dis- running out-400 a day. according to
n"Kotl .. tlon .nd <:OD>prom1te. bl.l pel"loOn"l tinguished se n ator from Montana has WUly Brandt. When we look that fact

u.
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In the face, we begin to realize what the
trouble Is.
The Senntor from Montana suggests
that the way to work toward reunification would be to start by having the west
Gormans and the East Germans talk
among themselves and attempt to negoUnte the unification of the two divisions
of Berlin. 1 heard that talk on the noor
today. That Is a consummation devoutly
to be wished, but we cannot make an
agreement with the slave when the master pas the slave under his thumb. That
is the situation. We might as well recognize It. That Is what we have been tryIng to break down. If \.he master were to
allow the slave freedom to work out his
own salvation, 95 percent of the East
Germans would vote for reunification.
It Is difficult to see how the attempt to
work out reunification could be any more
successful than our past efforts with the
Russians. We have tried to get the RUssians to agree. The East Germans are
not free to negotiate on their own. That
Is the big poillt. They are controlled by
the Russians. and therefore they would
continue to reflect the Russian control.
In effect. the Senator Is saying In his
speech that the West Germans should be
more flexible; they should enter Into
negotiations with the East Germans.
This Is something that the West German
Government. UP to date. has refused to
do. The West German Government is
an Independent nation. It claims that
East Germany is a part of Germany.
The contentloll Is made that the United
States can make the West Germans
change their J>OSIUon and become more
Ilexlble.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President. will
the Senator yield?
Mr. WILEY. Let me finish this para·
ll"T3.ph.
The tact Is that West Germnny Is a
proud and powerful ally of the United
States. AI; an ally. It has a mind of its
own. and we ennnot dictate to It. as the
Russians are dictating to the East Germans. The West Germans are the ablest
people In Europe. They know the situatlon; and when they tnke the position
they have taken. they take It with their
eycs open. They realize that they arc
under the thumb of the Russians. or the
Eo.st Germans. and they realize that they
cannot even neGotiate with the people
who are the sorfS.
I now yield to the Senator from
Montana.
Mr. MANSF!ELD. Mr. PreSident. J believe thM there should be called to the
Senator·s attention the fact that relationships exist at the present time betWC<ln the East German Government and
the West German Government. Such
relationsillps have existed for some
years. Those relationships are based
upon Interzonal aereements. The reo
suIt Is that trade amounting to hundreds
of millions of dollars Is generate<! between the two areas.
The $Cnator also makes the point that
I seem to be advocating an American
Initiative. What I have been trying to
advocate Is a western Initiative. includInc all the allies, and Including West
Germany. J do not think we can mnill_
taln a pctl"lflcd polley, because we know

that there Is no prospect of going for_
ward on that basis.
We are facing a deadline, May 27,1959,
at which time the SOviet Union has Indicated It will have all its troops and de·
pendent personnel wlthdrnwn from the
eastern sector of the city. I think we
must come Ui> with something In the way
of alternntlv~. I was very plcased when
Secretary Dulles came back and snld
that he would be willing to consider concessions on a QuId pro QUO basiS. 1 was
dellghted with the degree of ~ueces~ the
Secretary had achieved among our a\Ue~.
Dr. Adenauer, General DeOaulle, Ilnd
PrIme Minister Maemlliall.
So I do not Quite get the point the dl~_
tingulshed Senator trom Wisconsin has
!n rr.lnd, because, as I recall the speech
I made. there seems to be very little
difference between us.
I expres.eed the hope that those In the
Stnte Department would give some eonslderntlon to the speech made today. not
because of any personal Interest I have
In It, but beenuse ot the fact that some
suggestions are belD/!" made. and perhaps
out of those suggestions. or others which
mny be generated, will come a degree of
success In meeting the dlmculties which
eontront us 1n the Ckrman and Bnlln
s!tuatlon. and out of which. perhaps, may
come unification ot the two DerUm and
the two Germal,Ys a~ an earlier date
than any of us can Ilntlelpate at the
moment.
1 thank the Senator for yielding to me
and giving me an opportuniey to ans,,·er
him III part.
Mr. WILEY. Did the Senator ,,"Ish to
address an)· i>artlcular Qu~tlon to me?
In what direction did he desire to dlrect
my thought?
Mr. MANSFIElD. 1 wished to bring
to the attention of the SCnator the fact
that I understood him to sa)· that I was
advocating American Ininatlve. 1 wall
advocating Western initiative, which
would include all Allied Powers. and also
Dr. Adenauer.
Mr. WILEY. I do not think we are
very far apart.
The only Lhlng I disagree with Is the
ImplicatIon thllt there hns been no
initiative. In my opInion the executive
depllrtment. whose fUllctlon It is to
hlVldle foreign relations, has done a great
Job. As I said the other day, the situation Is similar to that of the man who
has an ornCl·y jaeknss. He can talk to
hIm and talk to him. but he h.w .better
not get too close to him. or he may be
kicked.
The Secretary ot State and his aSSistants have worked diliGently at thIs problem; Imd because they cannot get tho
jackass to agree, they are to blame.
That is the sort of Implication which
I do not like to have go out to the COW1_
try. I ~l"Bnt the country definitely to
understand my figure of speech.
We are continually In the midst ot a
political picture. I say. give credit where
credit is due. Lnter, as 1 conClude my
remarks, I shall have something to say
about the distinguished SCcretary of
State. He SCIVcQ under Acheson. Whell
I was chnirman of the Commlttec on
Foreign Relations. I snw his work. T
observed his work as a servant of the
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Democratic Party. I have seen him serve
for 6 years under PreSident Eisenhower.
I have seen hIm get acquainted with this
globe, as ""as Indicated by a distinguished columnist this merning. as no
other man In history has done. He
knowll every neighborhood. He knows
all the peoples. HeJmows the problems.
He has dealt with them.
Because we could not get the divergent
Interests to agree, he Is to blame. That
Is what I am objecting to. Such an Implication Is absolutely unfair.
Undoubtedly It has had ruuch to do wIth
sendIng Secretary Dullps to the hespltal.
He Is only human.
My next point is that the Senator from
Montana, in his speech. asks that not
only the We!t GermaDll, but the United
States, tllke a more tlexlble approach to
the problem Of German and European
$ccurlty. The S~nator trom MentflOa
mentioned the Rapnckl plan and the
Eden plnn. and Sl\ld we should explore
both ot them. We not only explored the
Eden plan. but put It for .... ard as l!. West_
ern proPOSilI at the Oeneva Summit Con.
ferenee. We have constantly been considering all kinds of possible European
security plans. We have agreed that we
must keep an open mind on,this subject.
On the other hand, all these plans
Involve a general1ll1thdrawal of Western
strength from Western Europe; and we
must be careful not to engage In too
much loose talk about the seeming reo
treat type of polley unless we have rea·
son to bleleve that the Soviets are dis_
POSed. to Initiate a pullback toward theIr
borders. As the Senator from Montana
stated a reI" mInutes ago, they would
get out of East Berlin: but they would
be on the line where troops would be
ready to march III and take over West
Berlin.
Our people are 1I0t blind. They recognize the fact that they are dealing with
some ot ~he most emclent-tr I might
can them that-Internatlonal Machla_
veillans In history. In doing so they nre
goIng to protect the Interests of the West
and or America.
we acree that we must kecp an open
mind on this subject. On the other
hand. all these plans Involve n general
withdrawnl or Western strength from
western Eurepe and we must be careful
thnt we do not ellgllge In too much loose
talk about this secmlngly retreat-type
of poliCY unless lII·e ha\·e reason to believe
that the Soviets are dISPOSed to Initiate
n simUltaneous pullback of their torees
toward their borders. Nothing In the
prescnt situation gives us hope that the
SOviets are. in fact. wil\mg- to Carry out
a meaningful pullback ot their forees.
Too much general talk regardIng neutral
zones In wIthdrawal or thinning ,';It of
our forees at this time. therefore, L"Ould
gll'e the Impression ot softness 011 our
pnrt and weakening of our resolve to
stnnd flrm in this situation.
Finally. the distinguished Senator
from Montann sa} ~ thllt standing firm In
Berlin Is a slogall alld not a polley.
The fact Is that standing firm Is the
bedrock of our ])Olley. It is Quite true
that. having taken this decIsion. the
preblem of how we implement the stnnd
In the fllCe of the many variations In
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whIch the threat can actuall,y present
Itself to us must be worked out..

That Is

exactn' wtu.t the executive branch ha.s

been explortng ever e1nce the crlsls de-veloped and It was the primary reuon
that secretary Dulles undertook hb re·
cent trip. We and. oW' allies. IU'C all
aware that we must not only be a&reed
on the fundamental concept of s tandIng
nrm; but that we must IlIao be ",reed on
the details of Implementing this policy.

It

w'"'

to help work out a common agreement on these details that the secretary
undertook thls trip to London, Parls, and
Bonn.
In other words. the Senator troll) Montana knOI\'S very well that the executive

branch here, L'I well as the lovemments
of our allies. knows that we must agree
on the detailed Implementation of the
polIcy In that we are all working now to

Sohn Poater Dun~. Counuea thousa nda
,.m pra ,. ror hI. recovery.
Whe n I thLnk or hIm, Burke', deftnlUon
of a au.teaman come. to my mind: He pCIoI_
_
"a dls poeLUon to pretetvt. en abLllt,.
to Improve."
He h .. aJ ....,.. been Ha frIend to tru t h:
In ac:tlon fa Ithful. a nd In h onor ele ... : .. ho
broke no promlHl. oerved no prIvate end,"
Thea wordt Of pope "h...""lerl.... thk ,rnt
public IUUIlt.
Let UI hope tha t durin, hit connltlCence
the carpIng voice. wUl ce....
In my opInIon no Amerl"an In !.he I"'t
~ yea .. h .. gIven of hlmleLt more u naUnt.Ingly an(\ de<1lca ted hlmaelt more to preterve
American than Poo\.er Dullea. When olhen
thre .. brIck. a t him. he Imlied a nd kept On
.. orklng tor !.he ,en. n1 ",dr.... . No m I n
In Amerlcall hlttoty h .. become to "'eli acquainted .. lUI thlt now neighbOrhOOd world
-.nd I~ prllbleml.
So we JoIn .. lUi the countl ... thou .. ndl
who Wllh hIm a lpeed,. recover,.. Hit coun.
try needs hIm.

Ict .areement on these details.
When we do get a.rreements. what
As the President and Wslter Lippmann
good are they? What does experience
teach UlI. FIfty out of 52 allreementl have said. the country need3 him.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. PreSident. will the
were not worth the paper they were Senator
yle]d?
written on. The KlI.lser said something
Mr. WILEY. I am happy to yield to

like that before. He spoke about a
treaty being a scrap of paper. We are
dealing with" people whoot! phl1050phy
a.nd morality In connection with international alIalNl Is vety low.
My overall reaetlon to the spee(:h of
the Senator from Montana. h01l.·ever. Is
that It Is a great deal more reasonable
than many one hu to listen to. and
there aTe a number of ~Uon&. u I have
indicated. In the speech which make
pretty good sense.
I do wa.nt to make very clear that, l3
the dlsUngulahed Senator hu said, when
the Executive Is "In the saddle" and hu
the re.spol13lblllty to deal with crises, and
that because the IOlution which one hu
hoped tor Is not forthcoming, that that
Is no reason to crltlcll:e the executh'e
branch Of our Oovernment. The Executive has had to deal wlt.h t.he representatives of the Kremlin for mlLllY years.
Our past experience, as I Indicated.
sholtiS what aaTeement.! with the KremUn are wort.h.
I want to make It clear also. that In
my humble opinion, the executive department has done everything that It
can do to brlnli/: about a settlement of
the German Issue. as well aa a settlement on the wider scale of world tensions, of which t.he Kremlin Is the source,
In my opinion the Serlin crisis In connection with the May date Is Il)erely another Indication· of what we have had
In the P84t. particularly lOme mont.hll
liO In Formoaa. It Is the purpose of the
Kremlin to get our attention on one point
on this little Ilobe, and then do It.! ne_
fariOUS work at another point. The executive department Is keeping It.s eye on
the whole show, 10 to speak. not merely
on the Kremlin. and It recoenlzes t.hat
this Is JUlt a paft of the world-dominatIng InJluence and phUO$Ophy of the
Kremlin.
Mr. President. when I heard the other
evenlne t.hat John Fo8ter Dulles had gon8
to the hospital once again, I IMUed a
release. and I ahall read that rtlease a~
this p:'oint. I said:
AU Amerl"a na Ind men,. In tar 011' land.

he ... d ,.IUI aorro,. ot Ihe hoepll-aUuUon ot

the senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I have
listened w]Ul a great deal of interest to
the ex~emely able addres:'l by my l ood
friend from Wisconsin In defense of
the State Department.
Mr. WlLEY. I thank the senator.
Mr. CLARK. I should like to ask my
good frlend this Ques tion. Earlier In his
remarks he offered for the RECORD the
column wrltten by Walter LIppmann
publil;hed In the Wuhl ne ton Post this
momlne. My Question is ..... hether he
lirteS with that column.
Mr. WILEY. I took Ule column from
the paper. lLIld the part 'that 1 read I
lirted ..o'\t.h. Ho ..... ever. I shall have to 1 0
over It very closely, because the Implication Is that I am not a,,'are of IIOmething In t.he article. I have not read It
closely, because I have been waltlne for
the senator from Montana to conclude
his remarks. so tJ'iat I may obt:LIn t.he
floor.
Mr. CLARK. I .... ould be hsppy to
have my good friend rtvlew Mr. LIppmann's column. which I personally beIleve Is a sound one. put whIch. It Se1lrns
to me. Is rather Inconsistent with the
point or vie ..... whiCh my friend from WlscOl13ln has been so ably expoundIng.
I should like to call to his attention
the parts of the column I have In mind.
and I should like to ask him .... hether he
agrees that the principal point Mr. LIppmann maku Is that the RUSSians are
f rlghtene<l by the IIltuaUon In eastern
Europe and that they fear an explO&lon
or revolution. and that such an explosion or revolution might require them to
rtpeat what t.hey did In Hun'gary; that
Jt t.hey did It In Eastern Germany what
they did In Huneary It ..... ould brln&:
about the great daneer of starting
world war In, because we would be unlikely to pennlt East Oermany to 10
down the drain the ..... ay we let Hungary
go. Mr. lJppmann suggests t.hat t.he
problem Is how we can prevent a revolution In a sate\llte country and how we
can maintain a situation In whiCh the
Russians can get .out of satellite countries and the sateUlte countries can re-
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main neutral and Serlin and Germany
can stili be free.
I s uspect that what Mr. lJppmann
says makes good sense and is pretty
much the essence or the brilliant ad dress made by the Senator from Montana ...... It.h his nine points that he uraes
upon the admin istration In that address.
I do hope that the Senator from WIscon.s.ln "'ill take anQther lOOk at the
Walter LIppmann column. and I hope
to nnd that he Is In agreement wlt.h it.
Mr. WILEY. I shall be happy to read
It lialn very closely, because I am al_
ways Interested In that the statesman
Lippmann_and I would call him that.has to say.
When he speaks about the fennent
In Europe, that Is only a part of the
story. There Is no question that there
Is & fennent all over the world. One
of the pl'oblems which Is confUlLlng the
Russians and giving them much trouble
at present. 8.5 the Senator probably
knows. Is the attitude of the Chlne~e.
There are 660 million Chinese who may
be "on the go." All these matters have
had the consideration of the Department of State. The Commlnee on Forel,n Relations has had this testimony
before It.
WUly Brandt, the Mayor or West Berlin. W8$ asked the other day ..... hether
the people In Poland. Rumanla. Bulgari a, and the Baltic State3 had fallen
Qleep and were aatlst'led ..... Ith their
rulera. The ansllier. In his Judgment.
Wh, "No", Of course. that g ives trouble
to t.he Kremlin. That Is a part of the
Russian problem.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the
senator further yield?
Mr. WILEY. I yield.
Mr. CLARK. I haye no Intention of
attrmnUna to pnga a e In a debate con _
cernln&: ""hether the action of the State
Department In the ))lilt has been rIght
or ",·ron,. I think the senator from
Montana ( Mr. MO\NSFtELD) was very wise,
Indeed.. In avoiding that pitfall. which
it .....ould be so easy to fall Into.
I suggest to the senator trom WIsconsin that we cannot solve this problem In the interest of peace and freedom
merely by saying over and over again
that the Ru~lal13 ha \'e broken 50 out or
62 agreements. and that theretore It
does not do any good to talk to them.
I suggest that we must talk and talk
and live with them, or else we wlll die
with thcm.
There are such things as selt-exe1lutIng agreement.s. particularly with respect
to the wlthdra ..... al of fo~es. which are
enfotclble. and this regardle$lL of the
clrcet of the written word. It has been
my feeling that to have a more fle:dble
pollcy toward negoUation Is highly
des lrnble.
I think the Senator from Montana
has rendered a distinct service. because
In many ways he Is sending word to
the State Department and to the eountry that. at leMt so tar D.'l a majority
of the U.S. Senate Is concerned, we are
ready right now to negotiate a meaning ful a greement..
We do not dismiss trom our minds
plll.ns wh ich were ridiculed ..... hen they
.... el'e firs t brou ght forward 2 yeal's agO
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by Mr. K ennan, Mr. Oalt.skHl, Rnd M r.
RaPllckl. and others. We will talk about
IUly~hlng In· the Interest or getting a
workable agree ment towBrd peace. We
lire not afraid t.o negotiate. We do not

trust the Rutslans any more than some

ot our friends In the State Department
do. But that Is no ren3011 ror not Ilttlng
down at the table nnd t.nlkilli with
th~m.

Mr. WtLEY. Acaln, the Senator {rom
P ennsyh'an!a has rnflde an Implied att ack on the other branch ot the Govern-

ment.

The Senator talks about tlrxlbllIty.
W hy does he not talk about t!exlblilty
with the people who arc mOlt concerned.
with It. instead ot maklnlil a general
statement? That Is the point I (l.m mak InI:'. When 1 tr ied law.utt!. I tried to
Bl"I'lve D.t eonc\us;ons on the tnets, not
on Implications. not C:1 rumon. That
WM my onl y point In I·al.slna: {hIe particular lull".
'fhe Senator re!ers to the brel'lklna:
by the RUMlan, of SO out of 52 Illilrunlent,. Let me tell the Senntor that It
\I:as In the days before Pearl Hllrbor that
t h], Chamber was as!up; the Pre,ldt'nt
was asleep; the people '1l;"('re ulup; the
Army, the Nnvy. and the Air Force ..... ere
asleep. They aald It could not happen.
It dId. That ..... as the only I"eason 1 referred to the breaklnlil by the Russian'
o f 50 out of 52 alilrccmenU. I do not
wnnt to have this country IiIO to sleep on
t he leneralily that It Is pOISlble to deal
with a Skunk: or someone who dot's not
keep fnlth.
Mr. CLARK I think \lhnl the S('na_
tor from WiJ;COllsin htu saId and \lhnl
J ha\·. laId ",!Ii ap)X'ar nccu"nt('ly In Ihe
RECORD. as our lilood friend,. the OmcLal
Reporters. wUI wnte It out. I hale 110
Intention of enlilagm!j: in furliler colloquY.
othe r than to say that I Implied nOUI:n'l.
It .... as not I ..... ho apo!;e of tht' breaklna
of 50 out of 52 agle<"rllents: It ... as my
good friend. the Senator from WI-conlin. who did so. I am cont('nd to let the
R ECORD stand as It '" III appeal' In Imnt
tomorrow morning.
Mr. WIL EY. I agree thnt I made> th e
statement. I dId !lQ for the shllLlle r('ll.. _
son that men ILke the Senator from Penn _
Syll'anla \lere here a~ the time of Pcarl
Harbor :md had uld It could not hap pen. I do not want the breaking or 50
out o f 52 agreemcn~ to be forgotten by
the Senator from Penmylvanla eIther.
Mr. CLAR K . At the time of Pearl
H arbor. I was in the uniform of my country. and not on the floor of the SCnate.
Mr. WI LE Y. Oh, YU. But other Senators were talking as the Senator from
P enns)'lmnla Is now 61X'aklng. That Is
the only pOint I am makIng.
Mr. Preside n t. J yield the floo r .
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr President, at the
very be~l nn ing. I co mm('nd the Senator
f rom Mon tana for the study which he
has gIven to the proble m he dlsclls.'ed
totlay. Spea k mt; fo r mysclf, 1 wllnt the
Soviet UnIon to know that the SeaRtors
of tile UnIted States are Intently de sirous of obtal nln!! peace for the people
of the ....orld. W hile I mllY sec some
dlmeultles In car ryillt; out the plans suq:ge~ted by the S~nator from M >Iltann.
and projectln;;: them~ell'es OHI" his talk.

I see II fervent pu rpose and desi re to
bring about peace In the world. That is
t he light In which I wish the people o f
Europe and the people of the wo rld wouI d.
u nderstand t he intention a nd tile p ur pOse of the U.S. Senue today.
Wh.o,t are some of the weaknesses
",·h tch 1 sec In the prop.ou.1 m ade by the
Senator from Montana? The Soviet
aays: "We ""Ill wtthdNl.w from Eaat Ber lin." The questlon is, how far 'Rill they
",-Ithdraw? In ",-hat POo1ture "" \11 they
be afur they have wlthdul"n? In what
position would ""e be It we withdrew f rom
Welt B~rlln and mO\'ed a d illance o f,
61\1', 120 miles to the ""ut?
My que\"y ""ould be: Bued upo n the
past conduct of the SovIet Union. could
WI rely upon their word that they hal'!
withdrawn and would atay wlthdra .... n?
Or ",'ould there be the necessIty of negotbtlng In • manner which ",'ould preclude the POUlblUty of their abandoni n g
theIr word and mO\'lna: immediately back
Into the arca out ot ... hlch they came If
conditions del'elJped which were un latl.sfocto\"y
S:!cond. for the people o f Wt";t Be rlin
and EiUt B'rlln to nea-OUate 'Rould be
~Imple_
1 think It is aeneraUy ... reed
thaI 9S percent of them lI'ould lubscrlbe
to the phllOlOphy of the West and ...ould
rep:ldlate that of the East. If the re
"'ere a unlftcntlon of the ,ol'ernment of
West Berlin and the IIO\'ernmenl ot the
SOI'iet and communl~m In East Berlin.
my qucry Is: Whlt type of aovernment
would result? I cannot forlet what hap pened In China when a coalition jfOl'ernmellt waa formed J cannot for;tet ",'hat
happened In YUl/v.lal'la when a cOILUtion
I'OVCrnmcnt 11,.&$ formcd. and MlklmUo_
lich, the Iplrlt ot tllC ftllht tor freedom.
was scuttlr-cl_ The result of !.hat coali_
tion IIOl'ernment 11,'1.1 that the Comm,-,n~t.s took control
Nor can I forl'et what happened In
Poland .... hen the SOviet Union propo6('d
a coalition ao\-ernment, Thc coalition
liIol'ernment Wal crelllcd, the Red
troops were there. they took control a n d
gave ordeT3, and loon the 10l"ernml'nt of
Polnnd became n Communist lovernm enl.
But In this situation there Is one gleam
of Illlht whICh would cause me to a nalyze
the F..ast BerlIn and thl' West Berlin situation In lhe bel!t'! that It m ljfht be
di~tlna:ulshed trom the YUII05lavill situ_
ation, the Cilma situation. and the
Poland situation. In China. the SoIJet
troops .... ere in the northl'rn part 01 that
count\"Y. nnd lh~y dIctated what was to
hnppeo_ A ~lmLL[l,r SItuation existed In
Poland. In YUIIOIlavln, the word .... hlch
cnme trom BrUnl n and from the United
States was thnt Mlhallo\'lch shou ld be
aban doned and T HO ehould be nccepted.
Whnt woul d hallJl(' n In East Berli n a nd
in Wcst Bcrl1n If those 1l0v Cl"lImen~
combIned and If the Soviet would stay
bnck? In all the other count r ies I h nve
mentloncd. conditions .... ere fe rUle for
the O\'e rlhrow of those who wanted free _
dom and for the hlltallfltion o f t hose
.... ho wanted dictatorship, But that condition would not prevail In O ermany.
As we havl' said. in Oermany 95 pe rcen t
of th~ people would stnnd by the govern )lIent:; of the f ree W e~t.

2015

B ut d es pite my belie f that these
d alliers a re connected with the SUCgesUona wh ic h have been m ade by the Senato r from Mon ta na, I belie ve It Is tho
r elponslblUt y o f the ex ecutive bra nch o f
our OOI'(' rnm ent a nd of th ill lea-Wa lL l'O
branc h to ex plore every m eans of reach Ina: In agreem ~ nt. restricted only by th e
p ropotllLon th at we m aintain our h ono r
and (hat ...e do not fa ll Into a pit which
...ould leave UJ ""eake r, afUr "'e negotiated. than 'II'e "" e re before ""e bega n
to neloUate.
Mr_ Presid ent, I yield the floor.
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positive Western policY on Germany, afC
not numerous. In official pOl!cy-wlth~
out a Shadow of a doubt on the part
of anyone, either Democrat or Republican_we are committed to stand fast at
Bcri!ll. We arc committed to the participation of Germans of both zones in
the! dlscussil,m of the problems of German
unity. We are committed to explore ways
other than nil-German elections, at least
IlS a beginning of tile solutlon to the
problem of German unity. We nre prepared to consider proposals which s1)ek
to limit certain types of weapons and the
alien military forces In both parts of
Germany within the framework of allEuropean security arrangements. With
these essentials, Mr. President, I expressed substantial agrel"menl In my remarks of February 12. although I may
differ In particulars wilh respect to ~he
way they are being presently pursued.
D.....ERI:NC£S WlTH O .... IClAL POLlCY

The basic points at which I diverge
from what Is present offiCial policy, I beI!eve. are these:
First. Ornclal paI!CY, In eITect. says that
the RUSSians cannot leave Berlin or the
routes of access to the city from the
West; certainly, that they cannot leave
in spirit and, perhaps, not even In body.
For my part, r would have no particular
desire to see them stay. in body or In
spirit, even If they could be persuaded
from gOing, which r doubt.
second. Omclal pol!cy does not seek
actively to try to bring about a unification of the municipal services and government of the two Berllns at the present
time. r believe that effort should be
made.
Third. OtTIcial poBcy does not seek to
enlist the United Nations in the Berlin
crisis at this time. For my part, I believe it is high time that this be done;
particularly, that ~he conciliatory servIces of the secretary General be sought.
Fourth. Omclal policy gives no evidence of conslderlng replacing the
thousands of Allied forces In Berlin with
West Germans. lr we are not going to
move or canno~ move In the direction
of trying to bring about thc unity and
Interim ncutralization of all Berlin
through U.N. conc!JIation. then, I belleve,
for the reasops I have already stated. we
must give serious consideration to
maktng this replacement.
CONt"l-UDlNo COMMENTS

FInally, Mr. President. I must bring to
the attention of the Senate the testimQny of General Maxwell D. Taylor. the
Chief of StnfT of the Anny before the
Senate Disarmament Subcommittee on
February 2, testimony which was released only last weekend. The General
said, In effect. that there must be total
mobil!zatlon of this Nation It we are to
resist force In Berlin. I must ask: What
is being done to bring about this total
mobllizatJon. or are we to assume that
It will not be necessary?
I hope deeply. Mr. PreSident. that
force will not be brought Into play at
Berlin but there J.s no certain promise in
present circumstances that it will not be.
I reiterate my bellet that It there Is to
be a chance to avoid Its usc. "a. Westem
initia.tlve fOr peace J.s essential."

The points which I raised In my remarks on February 12 were designed to
Indicate a POSSible direction for that Ini_
tiative.
Of equal Importance with the desire
for peace. Mr. PreSident. Is the energy
and torbearance with which thla Government pursues thl5 great need and
desire of mankind. Of greatest Impor_
tance is a national leadership which acts
positively for peace.
H the PreSident leads In that fashion.
he will find the people of this Nation
and the people of the Cree world wlll
be solidly behind him .
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President.
will the Senator yield?
lI-lr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr~ FULBRIGHT.
I should like to
take this opportw\!ly to eXPl'ess my appreciation. and I know tilc appreciation
of tile Senate, for ~he very (Inc Job the
senator from Montana has clone In
bringing this qUestion belore this body
and the country. and In developing It
in such a logical and effective way. as
he did today and a.s hc did on the previous occasion. 1 regret very much that
lllness prevent.ed me from being here on
the occasion of the previous sl>Cech on
this subject by the 6enat.or from Montana. The senat.or has already Inspired
a great deal of very fruitful discussion
of this issue. and I think the COWltry
and the senate will benefit lmmeasurably from the etrort3 of the 6enat.or from
Montana. I wish t.o Join all the othe r
Senators who have complimented thc
Senator from Montana. for his efforts.
which have contributed so much t.o better Wlderstandlng of this problem.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the dis tinguished chairman of the COmmittee
on Foreign Relations. I recall to the
senator's memory that ..... e came to the
Congress together in 1943, and since
that time we have had a fairly elose relationship In the foreign policy field. Of
course I am Indebted to the Senator
from Arkansas, ~he chairman ot the
Committee on Foreign Relations. for
his kind words. for hIs unfaillng under.
standing, and tor hls tolerRnce Rncl
streqgth over th-e years gone by.
Mr. PreSident, I now wish to turn t.o
another subject.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Montana has the floor.
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And even It we cannot, what shall we
have sacrificed by tr:yLng?

Polnt.:s" and 5: Unless a unified, neutraHzed Berlin under Unlted Nations'

auspices Is established as an Interim
measure, then Western forces must re_
main in Berlin, regardless of whether
the Russians leave, It Is time to think
seriousLy, however, of repLacing as
rapidly as possibLe the thousands of nonGel"man allied mUllan' personnel in Ber-

line with West German mll!tJa.
Here. £\.gain, Mr. President, I find In
present policy nothing comparable to this
suggestion, Present policy. saYll. in

eflect. that the Russians must stay In
BerBn-ln spirit, It not In bedy.

Apart

from the fact that I see no practicable
way t.o make them stay in either body or
spirit it they wish to go, I am moot reluctant to go along with a policy that
seeks to require the RUSSians to stay anywhere westward, It tliey propose to take

even a few st.eps backward~astward.
I am fully aware that th eir soinG may
complicate our remaining In S erlin. We
shall be face to face. then. with East Germans. They wl!l be Communists, to be
sure-but. nevertheless. Germans, not
Russians. Th:;: AlUed forccs may well be
compelled, in th4 latt anal,ysls, to face
them. !l we mean to stay in Berlin at all
costs.
It was an awareness of this probability,
Mr. President, which prompt.ed me to
suggest that It Is time to th ink serlousiy
of replacing the thousands of allled ml.l1tary personnel In We~t BerUn wh.h West
German militia. If there Is to be a loss of
life among East Germans, In order to
preserve what Is. In the last ar.alyslS. a
West German position e ... en more than
an allied position In Berli n. then it seems
to me best that the alHed forces move
as quickly 8.5 po.ssi ble to the re~erve. e ... en
as the Russmns intend to do on the other
side. This Is not a matler ot "pas~ lng
the buck." It is a matter of reeognizinS
that among Germans. as among others.
blood may wetl pro ... e thicker than Ideologies.
It will be a tras edy if men must die in
this situation In any event. It will hurt
the cause of freedom In Germany e ... en
more. howe ... er, if th!! Germans who may
lose their lives in a limited connlct tor
access to Berlin lose them by the action
of foreign forces.
I know. Mr. President. that there are
gra ... e risks In using West German forces
In thts fashion. Once InJccted Into the
Situation at Berlln. It Is dimcult to foresee the contingencies wh ich may subseQuently arise. That Is why I said 'It Is
time to think seriously of using them. not
that It Is time to use them. The risks
must be we ighed In the Ught ot all the
Infot'mation and estimates available to
the El(eeuU ... e. They must be wei ghed
against the countless risks or trying to
preserve. with Allied forces, a statu~ QUO
In a Situation which wJ!] change. Inevi_
tably. once the Russlans ha ... e left Beflin. There may be sound reasons tor
not taking this cour~e of substituting
West Germans for the Allied torces at
West Serlin. There are no sound rea SOIlS. howe ... er, for not el(ploring tully
Its implications within our own GovernNO. 32-10

ment and with Allied governments, or
tor tailing to do so promptly.
Point 6: There must be a great deal
ot talk between Germans who are in
authority in the Federal Republic and
Germans who purport to be in authority
in the Eastern zone.
This III the point, Mr. President, of
which much has been made In com·
"ments on my remarks of February U.
n seems to me that a monumental Issue
has been generat.ed here. although, In
fact. no substantial Issue exists.
The administration-the Western al·
lies-have proposed talks with the Rus·
slans, at which each 6.lde misht ha ... e
German observers. In other words. East
Germans and West Germans are both to
be admltt.ed to these talks on Germany,
it the Russians aceept the We~tern pro-_I.
Now. Mr. PreSident, does anyone believe that in talks on the German problem, these Germans-East and WClS~
Germans-are going to do nothing but
observe? No. Mr. President; they are
obviously going to talk, the West Ger.
mans through the allied natiOnli. the East
Germans through the Soviet Union. It
there Is a dilTerence between official pol_
icy and what I sUB ge~ted In thl~ respect.
It Is certainly a minor one. It I may
draw an analogy, perhaps I can make the
dllTerence clear. I sUsgested, In effect,
that the Germans-East and' West-e"o
oft Into another room and try to come
up with concrete proPQlials on the PJ"obiem ot German unJfication. whiCh they
would then lay before the al1!ed powers
and the Soviet Union, for approval and
for guarantee.
Many ot those who ha ... e commented
on this proposal have said In effect:
··No. That Is a dangeroU$ procedure."
'I1ley have said-those who endorse present offiCial policy on this pOint-that
the West Germans must whisper In the
ear of the aUles what they think should
be done about unification and the East
Germans mu~t whisper In the ear of the
SOviet UnJon. 'I1lell, the Western allies
and the So... let Union " 'Ill add their own
thoughts and try, out of the COIliIOmera.
lion. to reach an agreement.
Mr. President, either way Is agreeable
to me. Out ot my own limited experl·
ence at International conterences. howe ... er, I ha ... e my own views as to Which
way Is likely to offer Sreater prospect tor
success. Those who now conduct forei gn
POllcy ha ... e theirs. I am more than will·
Ing to try their way !l they believe It will
work. I ha ... e a feeling, however. that
bet ore we are done with this matter of
whispering In ears and the friction of no
contact between the Germans. we shall
be more than wlllins to try others.
Point 7: All-German elections may not
be essential to peace and to freedom. but
there must be some opportunity for the
people of East Germany. as there Is In
West Germany. to express their p;)llt~cal
preferences and to partiCipate In political atralrs Without terror. Unless there
Is, the search tor peace can lead to the
jeopardizing or freedom.
Here again, Mr. Pre~ldent. I do not
belie ... e there Is a basic dltrerence be·
tween the prescnt policies of this Gov.
ernment and the view which I stated.
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The Secretary of State made clear. long
betore my ~peech of February 12" that
aU-German elections need not be essential 8.5 a first step In German unification. I do not know at what stage they
would become CSSCllltlal, nor, l\'lth aU
due respect, do I belIeve anyone else does
a~ this time.
The Secretary has recognized that reality. and I applaud his recognition ot
It. I say further. however, that unlcss
the hand of polItical terror begins to
lift In East Germany there Is a danger
to freedom In any form of unification
which may be tried. While this point
has not been el(pllcltly stated by the Secretary, I am sure that those who are
responsible for the conduct of foreign
policy are not unaware of It.
Point 8: 'I1le Western allies and the
Soviet Union must guarantee for a pe.
rlod of time the unified Germany which
may emerge from dlscuss10ns among the
Germans. They must see to It that
Germany IS neither subjected to mili_
tary pressures from Its 'neighbors nor
becomes a source of milltary pressures
to Its neighbors.
Again, Mr. President, there Is no dis·
agreement on this obvious point. It has
long been a part of the polley ot this
Government to recognize that a peace
treaty for ~rmany, which provides for
the reasonable security needs of Ita
nel ghboI1l, Ineludilli the SOviet Union,
Is an essential of peace. One may differ
with the way this objective has been
pursued. but there are few dilferenees
a.s to Its essentialIty.
Point 9: It Is essential that our policy,
NATO's polICies, do not eXelude a careful consideration-may I repeat that
word, "conslderatlon"---<lf the Rapackl
plan, the Edcll pi"", for .. ucm!lll,... ,·il<t:d
zone In middle Europe. or Similar pro·
posals In connection with the unlflca·
tlon of Germany, predicated-may I
repeat that word, "predlcated"---<lr con·
tingent upon the outcome of the con·
ferences on surprise attack, and ~uspen·
slon of nuelear tests now going on in
Geneva.
The Western Powers have indicated
an Interest in negotiating a European
security pact. We are now seeking an
agreement. at Geneva. on the problem of
nuclear testing and the prevention of
surprise attack.
Further, I am gtven to understand
that It Is the polley of this dovernment
to recognize that agreement Is possl.
ble to exclude missile bases' from all
German soiL Similarly. that It Is pos.
~ible to thin out foreign forces In West
Germany in return for a thinning out
ot SOviet for~es In East Germany.
If that Is the case, Mr. President,
there IS no basic incompatibility between
the essentials that I listed and what
official poliCY I~ prepared_I repeat that
word. "prepared"-to do. The obJec·
U ... e is the same. I reser ... e the rJght,
howe ... er, to examine subsequently the
way we are going about trying to
reach It.
8.lMILiI.rrns IIrrwEEN OITICL\L POLler "ND
NUU: POINTS
The differences between what we are
dOing, as a matter ot omclal policy, and
what I suggested as the essentlal5 of a.
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dl.trBCted Or oba_a by the tW\lta and turn.
great knowledge. his great abmty. and of SoViet behavior, The rUndamen!.a1 qun_
the leadership which he hl\.S displayed, uon or ponc,. for us I. not ao much what
Ru ..lanl .r" lookLng for In Oerman,..
imotllI' as the Ber!!n and German sltUII.4 th"
We know what t.hey ..... e lookIng tor "na they
tlons are concetnoo, he Is In avery large may .-try ...ell seLze It whU" ...e "mu .. or
sense indispenSllble.
ftl8CLnlll" our,el"",," by t'1'lni to ln~rprct
I hope that any conferences covering the charades Of Rua.IBn beh"Vlor,
these two qucstloru;.-becnuse they arc
No, Mr. President. It Is more important
Interrelated-will be held In Washing _
to us. far more Important, to kno ..... \!o'hat
ton, where we can make use of Mr. we
are seeking In Germany.
Dulles' capa.eltles and abilities, to advise We ouuelves
must bring to this crisis not only
and lead the West.
In the la.st analysis, whether his health courage, but also conviction. We must
will permit him to make that contribu- bring to It a positive and undent.andable
tion Is for the President. the Secrel.4ry. policy which meets our essential national
and his doctors to decide, as the Presi- needs lUld the essentlal needs of freed om,
dent so cogently pointed out In his press and. If possible. m eets them In peace.
It ..... as that thought. Mr. President.
conference of Febcullry 25, 1959.
Let me emphlUllu, however. that be- which prompted me to list nine points for
cause Mr. Dulles Is III Is no reason for exploration In a search for a POSIUve
deelarlna a moraklrium on a frank and policy on Oennany last February 12.
full discussion of the Nati on's pollclcs Some of these points \!o'ere th en. o r at
1n the light. of the critical sltuaUon in least have alnce become, a part of the
Germany. It 1 know Mr. Dulles at all , present omclal polley of the United.
he ~'ould be the ftrst to recoanlze Ule State:!. Others are not a part ot that
need for this discussion to continue. He policy. They represent what. to me,
would be the first to denounce any seem rational approaches to varioua
ghoulish political proftteerlng on hls III· aspecl$ of the problem of Oermany, In
great meMure. they are not original exnes In order to silence this discussion.
In their restntement, as my Inserts
There are those who have expressed cept
confusion as to how I can support Mr. In the COti'CllUSTOlolAt RtOO1l0 of Februwill show. But tor their reDulles' continuance in oroce and stili ary 16. 1959.
In the context of the speech.
criticl!;C some of thc policies executed I~tatement
wish to make It clear that I claim full
under his name. I can only say that It
is not the ftn;t time. and I hope It Is respanslblllty.
acc.o.~JTVt.ATTOlol or THE ,..t,..E r<l1NT8
not the last. We shall have reached a
Mr. President, I should no ..... like to
very low point. Indeed, In the practice
of free and responsible government when review the nine points and to discuss
a Senator has no choice but to agree their status In omclal policy lit the pres100 percent with IL secretary of State ent time. as w('11 as certain ot the com menl$ whiCh have been ma!!e upon them.
or to hang him in emIlY.
I Intended to gO on '" I have in thla On February t2 T "!lId'
I can be ... tOnl. and IIUlnd rtldy to flUfpt
matter, I shall endorse the forelin
policies of this administration when I a better U!umln.tlon of the probLem throuil:h
belle\'e they are sound policies. I shall dlleuulon ana debue In Ule SeIlBt.e.
try to contribute constructively to their
I say that again. I may add. however.
reshaping when I believe that they are that little which has since transpired or
not.--I repeat the word "constructively." has since been said prompts me to
because 1 have alwass tried to operate modify these points In any sl&nlflcant
constructively. That!.s a position. Mr. degree.
President. which I have maintained since
Point 1: There must be no retreat of
I entered thls body. and also during the the forces Of freedom a~ Berlin. Mr.
10 year prior thereto when I served as a President. J said that. not once. but at
member of the Committee on f\)relgn ieMt si x times during the coursc of my
Mairs of the House of Representatives. remarks on Ecbruary 12. Weeks before
It Is the position I propose to m:Llntaln so that date. I had publicly endor$ed.. a draft
long as I am In the Senate. I shall Senate resolution which would hln'e upmaintain It resardless of the party which held the posilion of the administration to
!.s responsible for the admin istration or stand fast. That. 1 may add. Is the only
the Natlon's aJTalrs.
resolution on the oennan situation
I,rnTtnlt': ON .... XHlItrallCRO:V
whiCh I have endor$ed.. &0 far,
So far lIS I know. there hM not been
Further. I Propose to say what I
have to say when I have to say It, irre· IUly slgnlftcant dlfl'erence nmon& Demospeetlve ot Mr. Khrushchev's threal$ or crats and Republicans. or between the
blandlshmenl$. It is. to me, a matter senate and the excutlve branch ot the
of lndUrerence whether Mr. Khrush chev Government. on the need to stand fast
agrees or dlSRirees with me. I hope this at Berlin. Certainly there never has
Government. Mr. President. will never, been on my part.
Point Z: The Germ:'!. n leaders of the
out ot a timorous feeling that Mr. Khrushchev may disapprove. tail to stand for two BerUn communities should be urged
what It must stand for. EqualLy. Mr. to be&ln 5CrlOUS elloN to unify the pubPresident, I hope that thls Oovernment lic serviCe:! and munlclpnl (!:O\'ernment or
will never tail to act a.s it must act out or that city. I know. Mr. PreSident. that
an even more timorous reeling that Mr. there are those who will say this apKhrushchev may approve. What I said proach Is illusory IUld unrealistic; that
on thls point on February 12 I believe the East Germall.'l cannot be expected to
bears repeatllli'. I said then, and. I say agree even on a common sewage system,
again today:
let alone on a common municipal &overnmemo I ,,"'ould point out In reply. how·
It we are to be prepared to lace this crlsl.
In Germany. I~ 'IIIll be best not to beCOme ever, that it Berlln does not have a comand because of hil;

grea~

capnclty, h is
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mon ~e~'age system. It does have a common subway system. If the German
leader ot East and West Berlin can
a&ree on that. M they have. is It beyond
the realm of the possible that they may
Rllrec on other common publiC services,
particularly If they mean to have peace;
or that they may reaCh a series of agree·
ments which might ultimately lead to a.
single m unicipal government for the
city? I must Mk: What stands In the
way of an Initiative of this kind? What
wlll be lost by trylng to bring o.bout thls
proGress toward municipal unity In Ber_
lin? If we mean to have peace. I be·
lIeve the effort should be made. It~hould
be made not only to ease the danger of
war at this most critical point In Ger many; It should be made. too. because
If It Is 8ucce:dul, out of the microcosm
of Bf'rlln could emerge patterns of unification for aU ot Germo.ny.
BerUn. of course. Is an aspeet of the
whole problem of German unification but
it is aiso the mOISt preslu",c and compelling aspect. It Is at Berlin and along
the routes of access to that city that the
danll'er of connlct Is greaten. In that
sense It requlnos the most Immediate at·
tentlon. ('ven It solution to its problem
of unlflclltlon may be merely by means
of Interim solutions. pendmi the outcome of the whole problem or German
unification. So tar M I kno\\'. Mr. President. at pre5ent we are d.olng nothing.
In an om '10.1 sense. to bring about an attempt at munltlpaJ unity In B<-rlln.
Point 3: The conciliatory un'LCf'.! of
the United. Nations and. particularly. ot
il$ Secret:'!.ry Genenal. should be enll.l.le<i,
to try to de\-elop an ali-Berlin gOHrnment.
H
lueh I\. ao\'crnment does
emel'Re In Lhe mun.icipallty, then a
United Nallons emer~ency foree Should
replace both Commun4t and AWed
forces In malntatng free access to the
city from all dIrections. pendml' a Ken·
erol settlement ot ~he German problem,
So far as I know, Mr. President. 110
omclal steP3 ho.ve been tak('n In this
dh'CCUon, Thele are hlnls. Mr. Presl·
dent. that If trouble does de\"~lop at BerUn. then the matter will be taken to Ule
UnlU!d. Nations. 1 would deem it a welcome chllll(le. Mr. President. tor once to
brln.g the United Natloru; Into nn InternatiOlUl1 punle before. not alter. the
pieces ho.ve IJ.e.cn hopelessly scattered.
Those In the Senate who sa"'" nt to
comment on m:my parts of my last
statement gcnerally refmlned from comment on this point. I am not prepared
to conclude. howe\·er. that In Gel·many
at this time there is no possible const.ructi\'e role for the United Nations
and. the Secretary General. I beUel'e
that there Is somethin't' to be 5.'1ld for an
attempt to bring the United Nations Into
the situation. now. In the role of nre·
prevention. not mel'ely laler. In the role
of flrefl<:htlng. For my part 1 would
much prefer to sec the whole city of
Berlin neull'fllized on an Interim basIS.
under United Nations auspices. 11 that
can be obtained. rather than to have
E:l.'it Getman agenl$ of the Soviet Union
stamping the pennll$ of weste rn allll"d
transports to West Berlin. We can not
know whether such an arrnngement cnn
be obtained. wlUI we try to obtain it...
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at least unite and steel the Nation for
the dangerous days which lie ahead.

Mr. MANSFIELD.

Mr. President. I,

too. wish to speaK on the OClman question. I nm $Orry that I did not complete
the pN!paratJon of my speech In time to
give copies to my colleniues, to the omclal Reportel"S, or to the pre~s.
I am rrntdul to the Senator from
Conneelicut for showlns- me and others
of his colleaiu('&-If not all Of them_the
courtesy of sendlnlj: to us coplcs of the
magnltlcent speeeh which he hu just
completc<t. I commcnd hIm most highly,
because I thInk he has made a N!al contribution to the public undcrstandlng of
this mO$t Important proble m 1 believe
that In emphas./:r.lng the dlmcultles which
will face our country and the free ~:orld
on or before May 21. he hu rendcred II
service which should be nppreclated by
all.
He minced no words In hI., ~P«'Ch. I
Shall mince no words In mine. ....s a
U.s. Senator from the Stnte of Mon tana. like the U.S Senlltor from the
State of Connecticut or IIny other State.
I have a duty and a re6poUSlbUity to call
my 6hou 8$ I sec them, to let the cards
fall where they may.
So with this npolotn' to my cclleagues.
the Officla] Reporters of Debates. and
the Pl·ess for not having a prcpared copy
of my speech. lind with my public commendaUon and congratulations to the
dlstlngulshcd Senator from Connecticut
for making an exccllent speech and lay _
Ing It on the line. I wlsl1 to ~lI y thanks
because he hos rendered a public service.
I hope other Senatou. In addition to·the
Senator from Connccticut lind the Sen_
ator from New York. will likewise t.l\ke
the floor and try to let thc people of this
country !\nd the world know ju~t what
the .... meriean pOsition Is. and to empha _
siw that, regardless of any dltferenC6$
as to how wc Shall achieve our objective,
there arc no dltferences.so Car as our de_
sire and our detcrmlnaUon to remaln
In W('$t Berlin are concerned.
SOme days IIgo. I discussed In the
Senate the coming crlsb In Germany.
Other Mcmbera have since contrlbutc<t
to the dl$Custlon of this crltlca] matter.
That Is all to thc good. I am persuaded
thllt out of this turmoil of thought will
comc a tll·m and POSltI\·., polley. a policy
Which. cI'en If It does not yield a rapid
resolution of the OerUlan sltuaLlon, wlll

Let there be no mistake about what
does lie ahead. Thl.s I.s no diplomatic
lark on which the world I.s about to embark at Berlin. This 15 no chlld·s play
of blind man's buff.
When I addressed the senate on lilebl1,Iary 12. Mr. PresIdent. I made a deletion from my remarQ Just a lew momenu before I dellvered them. I did so
because I did not wish to be undulY
alarmist. Now the same thought ha.s
been expressed by the Prime Minister of
the United Kingdom. ltha.s becn recoilnlted by Members of this body such as
the distinguished Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Cool'uJ and Increasingly by
the press. It Is at least beginning to
sin ll: home that the world Is entering
into a situation In Germany III which.
the lives of tens of mlllLons of peopleAmericans Included-may well balance
on the avoidance of a single significant
error.
The British Prime Minister warned,
the other day. of a suicidal war by "mlscalcu]atlon:' As the distinguished Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON). a
former Assistant Secretary of State. has
sRld th.ls afternoon. the Brltlsh Prime
Minister also used the word "muddling:'
I can say now with greater aasurance
what I Intended to say but deleted from
my remarks on February 12: '·1 e:oo;press
to the Senate my belief that Just ahead
lies a period which may ,,:ell see the
Nation and the rest of the world miss a
deva.statJng war by a very narrow margin. Indeed. It Is a period which may
see us In ",'ar. IImltc<t war or unlimited
war, ""ar by accident or war by design. ",·ar by childish IItubbornness or
bravadO."
"><1: uSI'O .. Sf1l.LTTT op u .....TOII.. n. TI.I:
If that Is the case. Mr. President. what
are the Members of this body to do?
Are they to guard their sUence when
conscience compels them to speak? .... re
they to Ignore their reSPOllSlblllUes to
their SUltes and our country as they see
tho$e responslbUltJes? Are they to accept as ali-pervasive the undoubted
wisdom of the PrC5lden~ and lhe cxeeuUve branch of the Government? Or
are they to think for themselves and
speak for themselves?
Are they to be more concerned with
how words wi!! sound nbroad, and so hold
their peace? Or must t.hey. even mON!,
seek to dispel any uncertaInties of the
people of the Nation as to the course
whIch thIs Government l$ pursuing. and
to seek to do $0 by examining the Issues
which underlie that course? Are they
to walt until they hear what the Department of SUlte has to say on the m atter
and then parrot agreement? Are they
to walt to hear what Mr. Khrushchev
has to say, .so that they may be /lure
that what they su"b$equenUy say will be
In disagreement?
I do not know what others may contend In this matter. I can spea k only
for myself. For myself. Mr. PreSident,
I can say only that when conscience
compels me to speak, l owe It to the
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people of my State and our country to
/lpeall: out. Por myself, Mr. President,
I hold that the moot important matter
Js not how people abroad may Interpret
my words. Important as that may be.
It ls more Important that the people of
my State and our country understand
fully what Is at stake In this llituatlon.
More Important Is the need 01 the ~
pie of the United St.I\tes to be satJsfl.ed
that the course to which they are com_
mittee! by their Government ls a sound
one. II they are, to be asked to give their
IIveJ, as weU they may be, then the course
of thls Government must represent the
outgrowth of pOlicies whiCh refteet the
deepest needs of tile people of the United
Statel. They must be pollclCll which are.
In lact, the best that can be devised by
thls Government to safeguard the N&._
lion and freedom. and to do so, It ))03 /Slb]e. In pellce.
Mr. PresIdent. to those who say we
may upset people abrood by our discusSIOllS, I clln only reply that we do not
fool anyone abroad If we fool our~elveJ
at home. The unity of the slogan may
well be no unity at all. It may well be
merely the facade of unity: the Communist. the totalitarian concept of unity.
The unity of free man needs to rest
on ftrmer ground. For the grim days
which lie ahead In Oermany, this Nation
neel1s the unity which can come only
from an understanding of where we
stand. ",'here It ls we are headed. and why.
To $tand last In Oermany. as Indeed we
must, we need to think carefully, to think
deeply. and we need to do It now. We
need to speak out seriously. soberly, and
we need to do It now. TIle time to examine pollclcs Is before. not after, their
coruequences are upon us. I emphasize
that point-before, not after-as In
Korea a few years ago.
POfIIT.Off Off ..... I>l1U.d

Mr. PreSident. I yield to no one In my
appreelation of the enormous burdens of
the secretary of State and his Department. charged. as they are, with primary
responSibility, under the PreSident. for
the Nation's policies. I believe the
reeord of my position In thIs matter Is
very clear. I regard Mr. Dulles, as I
have since I have known him. as an able
and a dedicated Civil servant. I have
endorsed many of the policies which ha\·e
been pursued since he took otnce. I have
worked with him closely, very closely. on
several of these matters. I have never
felt. however, that this con~tralned upOn
me a silence when I dl$(l,greed: nor. I am
sure. did he. I favor the continuance of
Mr. Dulles In omce now. not out of any
sentimentality. but because I believe that
If his health permits, Mr. Dulles Is capa._
ble of making an extremely slgnlftcant
contribution to the security of the Nation
find to the search for peace. particularly
at this time.
I do not believe In the concept of the
Indlspensab]e man. However, I do believe that there are times ",·hen a man
may become Virtually Indlspensab]e.
Because of what Mr. Dulles has done over
the past several months, espeelaUy dur Ing the past several weeks. In going to
Weslern Europe and d!$Cusslng the Ber_
lin and ~l"man matters with our allies,

